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A B S T R A C T
This paper shows that there is a presumption that Pareto-eﬃcient taxation entails a positive tax on capital. When
tax and expenditure policies can aﬀect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly oﬀset,
those eﬀects need to be taken into account, reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution. The
paper extends the 1976 Atkinson-Stiglitz results to a dynamic, overlapping generations model, correcting a
misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax. That result required separability of consumption
from labor and that the only unobservable diﬀerences among individuals were in (ﬁxed) labor productivities. In
a general equilibrium model, one needs to take into account the eﬀects of policy changes on binding self-
selection constraints. In a simple model with time separability but with non-separability between consumption
and leisure, capital taxation depends on the complementarity/substitutability of leisure during work with re-
tirement consumption.
The ﬁnal section constructs a simple two class model, capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers
who save for retirement, whose productivity can be enhanced by (publicly provided) education. It derives a
simple expression for the optimal capital tax, which is positive, so long as the social welfare function is suﬃ-
ciently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is suﬃciently high.
1. Introduction
Beginning with my supervision of Tony Atkinson in Cambridge in
1965–1966 while I was a junior research fellow at Gonville and Caius
College, Tony and I enjoyed a close collaboration and friendship. One of
our early results that received a great deal of attention was that when
there was separability in the utility function between consumption and
leisure,1 if there existed an optimal income tax, it was optimal to have
no commodity taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976). An immediate
corollary of that result was that, under the stipulated conditions, there
should be no tax on interest income—treating consumption at diﬀerent
dates as diﬀerent commodities. This and similar results from optimal
tax theory were seized upon as a basis of policy by those critical of
capital taxation.2 Those who did so typically did not understand (or did
not want to understand) the limitations of the model. As always, one
has to look carefully at the assumptions going into a model to judge
whether they provide an appropriate basis for policy.
This paper argues that even within the conﬁnes of a model in which
diﬀerences in labor productivity are the only source of diﬀerences in income,
the conclusion that there should be no capital taxation is in general wrong,
even in the presence of separability, and that in a plausible model where
individuals diﬀer as well in the amount of inherited capital, there is a pre-
sumption for a possibly quite high tax on income from capital.
This paper is divided into eight parts. The ﬁrst presents some general
reﬂections on our 1976 paper, our motivations in writing it, what we saw
as some of the limitations, and some of the important extensions of the
result in the subsequent literature. The second presents the basic model,
based on Stiglitz (1982a), including some straightforward but important
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1 That is, utility U could be written U=U(u(C), L) where C is the vector of consumption goods and L is labor supply. We do not require additive separability.
2 See, for instance, Mankiw et al. (2009) and Atkeson et al. (1999). Using a quite diﬀerent framework, with individuals with inﬁnite lives, Chamley (1986) has also concluded that the
optimal tax rate on capital should be zero in the long run. In Section 3, we consider a social welfare maximization problem extending inﬁnitely far into the future, but using an
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extensions to Pigouvian taxation and the provision of public goods. In both
cases, in the case of separability, results obtain that are much more akin to
those that arise when government can impose out-of-lump-sum taxes than
to those generated when government relies on distortionary Ramsey re-
sults. For instance, the sum of the marginal rate of substitution equals the
marginal rate of transformation. In the standard Ramsey-Diamond-Mirr-
lees model with public goods with distortionary taxation, the Samuelson
(1954, 1958) condition for optimal supply—that the marginal rate of
transformation (MRT) equals the sum of the marginal rates of substitution
(MRS)—is altered, and instead MRT < Σ MRS, the marginal rate of
transformation is less than the sum of the sum of the marginal rate of
substitution; and the level of consumption of public goods is reduced.3
Section 3 shows that the Samuelsonian condition is restored with optimal
non-linear taxation, provided there is separability between labor and
consumption goods.4 Similarly, ﬁrst-best Pigouvian taxation is optimal
with separability either between leisure and consumption, or between the
externality on the one hand and consumption and labor on the other,
though in the latter case, the Pigouvian tax has to be interpreted as the tax
in excess of the optimal commodity tax (the shadow price).5
To analyze optimal interest taxation in general equilibrium, once has to
construct a dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 4 does this, em-
bedding optimal non-linear taxation in a general equilibrium overlapping
generations model. While Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) had extended the
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) model to a similar overlapping generations
setting, this paper, a development of Stiglitz (1985a, 1985b), provides the
corresponding extension of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). The conclusion of
Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) was that “it is diﬃcult to make a strong case
either for the expenditure tax or for taxing interest income at the same rate
as wage income.” By contrast, we ﬁnd that the basic results of our static
model extend to this dynamic framework: (a) With separability, and ﬁxed
relative productivities, there should be no taxation of capital income pro-
vided that relative wages are either observable or unaﬀected by taxation or in-
vestment (by the consumption/labor supplies which they induce); but (b) in the
absence of separability between consumption and leisure, but with inter-
temporal separability, whether there should be an interest income tax or
subsidy depends on whether ﬁrst-period consumption is a complement or
substitute for leisure.6 But both separability and the italicized proviso are
crucial. While the latter result is reminiscent of that of Corlett and Hague
(1953) (in a model with no income taxation and just commodity taxation),
we establish it in the presence of an optimal non-linear income tax. (This is
important, because in many cases, the presence of one tax—in particular an
income tax—markedly changes the taxes that should be imposed elsewhere
in the system. For reasons we explain, with unconstrained non-linear taxes,
results that hold only with lump-sum taxes are often restored.) As a prelude
to the later discussion of public investment in the next section, the section
also extends the analysis to show that the standard result on the desirability
of productive eﬃciency holds.
The rest of the paper then provides a critique of the Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) result. The ﬁfth section focuses on the case where relative
wages are not ﬁxed. Even with separability between labor and consump-
tion, (a) it is in general desirable to impose distortionary commodity
taxation, even on high-ability individuals; (b) there should be a distor-
tionary income tax, even on high-ability individuals; (c) there should be an
interest income tax (or subsidy), even on high-ability individuals; (d)
productive eﬃciency of the economy (where there are no production taxes
and the marginal rate of transformation of all goods is the same among all
ﬁrms) is not desirable7; (e) even asymptotically, the rate of return on
public capital goods may not equal either the pure rate of time discount or
the rate of return on private goods; the long-run return to some kinds of
public capital may be lower than the social discount rate.
Recent policy discussions have suggested the desirability of focusing
on policies which improve the market distribution of income, leaving
less of a burden on redistribution.8 Standard models which assume that
relative wages are ﬁxed cannot address this issue. Our analysis estab-
lishes that this intuition is correct. In each of the cases listed above,
taxes and expenditures are adjusted at the margin to increase wages of
the low skilled relative to the highly skilled.9 Formally, the improve-
ment in the distribution of income loosens the binding self-selection
constraint, allowing for a Pareto improvement.
The optimal tax literature developed in the context of an economy
of seemingly self-employed individuals, say making widgets. The only
information problem was that of the government, which, seeing the
output of widgets (or income from producing widgets) could not tell
whether a high output was the result of hard work (long hours) or high
ability. But most individuals in a modern economy work for others, and
employers have an analogous information problem to that of govern-
ment: they seek to discriminate among individuals, including by using
self-selection mechanisms. But private screening is aﬀected by public
tax policy, and optimal taxation needs to take this into account. Section
6 does this, again showing that the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) result
may not hold, even with separability.
Sections 7 and 8 consider optimal taxation with inheritances.
Inheritances mean that individuals diﬀer not just in their labor
productivity, and optimal taxation ought to take that into account.
This is so even in a world with dynastic families optimally sharing
their wealth with their children. We show that the appropriate public
policy response is taxation of inheritances and the return to capital.
But the design of capital taxation is more nuanced than populist calls
might suggest: careful attention has to be paid to incidence. A sim-
plistic call for capital taxation with proceeds distributed to workers
may actually leave workers worse oﬀ. In a simple two class model
(workers and capitalists), we derive a simple formula for optimal
taxation when the proceeds are invested in human capital or in
productive capital investments. The real argument behind the taxa-
tion of capital is almost surely related to disparities in inherited
capital and in the ability to obtain returns out of capital—and in
luck—than with diﬀerences in productivities among workers, the
subject of our 1976 paper.
Section 9 provides some concluding remarks, including putting the
results presented here into some broader perspectives.
2. Reﬂections on the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem
Our analysis was motivated in part as a critique of Ramsey taxation
(Ramsey, 1927), which seemed to justify not just high taxes on basic
necessities like food (which had a low elasticity of demand) but also
patterns of pricing by monopolies like AT&T.10 Ramsey had established
that optimal commodity taxes should be inversely related to the
3 See Pigou (1947), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974). At-
kinson and Stern make the important point that one cannot infer from the fact that the
sum of the MRT < Σ MRS the impact of distortionary taxation on the supply of public
goods.
4 Boadway and Keen (1993), using the Stiglitz (1982b) framework for the analysis of
optimal taxation, had noted this result earlier. See also Kaplow (1996).
5 Kaplow (2006a) had noted the former result. Sandmo (1975) had established that one
could obtain results that were closely akin to ﬁrst best Pigouvian taxes even in a Ramsey-
Diamond-Mirrlees model.
6 Similar in spirit to the Corlett and Hague (1953) analysis.
7 One of the important results in Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) was establishing that op-
timal taxation entailed only consumption taxes, no production taxes, and that the
economy was productively eﬃcient. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971, 1972) had established
that this was not so in the standard Diamond-Mirrlees model, but with restricted taxation
(i.e. the government could not impose 100% taxes on pure rents or proﬁts and could
impose taxes on all goods and services at diﬀerential rates). The result here generalizes
that of Naito (1999), whose analysis built on Stiglitz (1982a)
8 See Hacker and Pierson (2011) and Stiglitz et al. (2015).
9 In Stiglitz (1982a), I showed that this was true for taxes on labor income, but did not
explore the full range of issues examined here.
10 See, e.g. Baumol and Bradford (1970) and Boiteux (1956). Elsewhere, David
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) explained that while there were some similarities between
the two problems, there were also some critical diﬀerences.
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elasticity of demand and to the elasticity of supply in a model in which
everyone was identical; hence there were no distributional con-
cerns—and therefore a lump-sum tax presumably would have been
acceptable. Our 1972 paper (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972) had shown
that in the absence of an income tax, optimal commodity taxes could be
described by a simple Ramsey-like formula incorporating distributional
eﬀects, which suggested that when distributional concerns were given
suﬃcient weight (for instance, in a society with a high level of both
inequality and aversion to inequality) goods like food, with a low price
elasticity of demand but a low income elasticity of demand, would not
be taxed at a high rate, but rather, that luxuries like perfume might face
high rates, even though they have a higher price elasticity than food.
We were, however, never satisﬁed with that result, since it was obvious
that we had an income tax, the intent of which was at least partly re-
distributive.11 The question was, given the existence of such a redis-
tributive income tax, was commodity taxation still desirable? Our 1976
paper yielded stronger results than we had anticipated.
Another of the motivations behind our paper was to demonstrate
two general results in the general theory of screening in the context of
optimal taxation:
(a) In general, the optimal commodity taxes depended on the set of other
taxes that were available.12 The analyses of Ramsey (1927) and
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) clearly depended on the absence of
lump-sum taxes. With lump-sum taxes, they would be employed,
and the optimal commodity taxes would be zero. Some of the
Diamond-Mirrlees results, both on production eﬃciency (not using
producer taxes) and the structure of taxation, were shown to be
undermined if there were proﬁts (rents) that could not be taxed
directly at 100%13(Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1971, 1972). Our 1976
paper (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) thus explored the interaction
between an (optimal) income tax and commodity taxation.
(b) The optimal income tax problem was at its heart a standard pro-
blem in asymmetric information with adverse selection. We as-
sumed that individuals diﬀered only in their abilities to perform
work, and they all had the same endowment of time and the same
utility functions. The Mirrlees optimal tax problem could be
thought of as eﬃciently extracting information about those diﬀer-
ences as one raised tax revenues. Even though there was a single
“dimension” in which individuals diﬀered (ability), in general, it
seemed possible that one could extract information about that dif-
ference more eﬃciently by looking not just at the individual's labor
supply, but also at his consumption patterns. While that conjecture
turned out to be true in general, in the special case of separability,
Pareto-eﬃcient taxation required only an income tax; there was no
beneﬁt to be had by using information about consumption patterns.
We never thought that the separability assumption was plausible. It
meant that there were no goods that were complementary to leisure.
Clearly, the marginal rate of substitution between skis and, say, food
depends on the amount of leisure. Someone with no leisure time simply
doesn't value skiing much. Thus, we never attached much weight to the
result that there should be no tax on capital with separability.
But this was not the only, or even the most important, reason that
our theorem did not provide the basis of policy for capital taxation. For
instance, if individuals diﬀered in other ways—as in fact they do, in
their level of inherited capital and their ability to earn returns on ca-
pital—it was possible that capital taxation was desirable, even if the
separability assumption held. Indeed, it is not hard to generate more
general plausible models in which capital taxation is clearly desirable.
Showing this is one of the main objectives of this paper.
Thus, in Section 8, we consider a simple model, which perhaps captures
key aspects of the sources of inequality that give rise to the desirability of
capital taxation far better than generalizations of Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) discussed earlier in the paper. We assume that there are two classes
of individuals: a group of capitalists with large endowments of capital who
invest their capital, earn returns, consume, and leave bequests to their
children; and workers. The capitalists are suﬃciently richer than the
workers that the social marginal utility of a dollar to the capitalists is neg-
ligible.14 It is obvious that in such a situation the optimal utilitarian15 tax on
capitalists is close to a Rawlsian tax, maximizing the revenue that one could
obtain from a tax on capital.16 It is clear that the optimal capital tax is
signiﬁcantly greater than zero, and considerable evidence that it is far
higher than the current tax on capital, especially the tax on capital gains.17
There are other thought experiments that help us understand the
role of capital taxation, and why in general it should be positive.
Consider, for instance, a simple model in which all members of a group
of individuals have an equal endowment of capital, but some in-
dividuals are better at transforming a unit input of capital into output
(i.e., they are better at selecting good projects). Assume that the more
eﬀort an individual exerts, the higher income; and that there is dis-
utility associated with the exertion of eﬀort.18 Then the optimal tax
structure for this group would be parallel to that which we analyzed in
our paper: with separability between the utility of goods and eﬀort,
then the optimal tax is only a tax on capital income. In the absence of
separability, both goods taxes/subsidies and a capital tax are desirable.
With individuals having equal endowments of both capital and
11 Our 1972 results would, presumably, still be relevant for developing countries and
emerging markets in which income taxation played little role, though in many such
economies other considerations (such as migration and rural/urban income diﬀerences)
play an important role. See Sah and Stiglitz (1992).
12 There are a set of parallel questions in the more general theory of incentives and
selection with asymmetric information. For instance, the design of the optimal share-
cropping contract is aﬀected by the ability of the landlord to aﬀect credit, the purchase of
inputs, and the choice of technology. See Stiglitz and Braverman (1982, 1986a, 1986b.)
13 See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971, 1972). They thus reconcile the Diamond-Mirrlees
results, where supply elasticities play no role, and Ramsey's analysis, where they are
central. Dasgupta and Stiglitz also show that other restrictions on taxation fundamentally
change optimal tax structures, including the desirability of eﬃciency.
14 This model is a generalization of Stiglitz (2015) and Mattauch et al. (2016, 2017). In
many ways, it formalizes the model that is implicit in Piketty (2014), building on Stiglitz
(1969a).
15 In the discussion below, we often refer to results based on a utilitarian social welfare
function, such as that employed by Mirrlees (1971). But virtually all of the results would
hold for any individualistic inequality-averse social welfare function, e.g. along the lines
discussed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973), and indeed, for any Pareto eﬃcient tax
structure (Stiglitz, 1987; Brito et al., 1990).
16 It is easy to design capital taxes that eﬀectively tax only the capital income of ca-
pitalists, e.g. exempting life-cycle savings or taxing only the returns on capital above a
certain level. (In this model, there is great inequality in the ownership and returns to
capital.) The analytics sometimes turn out simpler for a general tax on capital.
17 Especially in countries like the United States, where there is a step-up-in-basis at
death, resulting in capital gains not being taxed at all. There are a wide range of ways by
which through tax planning high income individuals can reduce their taxes. See Stiglitz,
1985b.
18 Note that if the higher returns of some individuals are just a result of luck, then
“excess” returns (i.e. returns above the average) should be fully taxed, since there are no
adverse incentive eﬀects. The same thing is true if the higher returns are a result of just
inherited ability or better connections. (Such taxes could, of course, aﬀect the incentives
of those providing “connections,” if it is costly to do so or if the beneﬁt to the “gift” of the
giver depends on the amount the recipient receives after tax. See Section 6 below.) In
each of these cases, the desirability of a highly progressive capital tax is obvious. Here, we
make the equally obvious point: if there is an unobservable variable, eﬀort, that, together
with ability, determines returns to capital, there should be a progressive tax along the
lines of that analyzed in the optimal (labor) income tax literature. There is one diﬀerence:
If we assume that total returns, R, are a function of capital, K, ability, a, and eﬀort, e,
R= R (e, K, a, ϵ), where ϵ is a random variable, and Utility is a function of consumption
and eﬀort (but not of K), then there is an additional variable we have to deal with. (It is as
if individuals had diﬀerent endowments of time.) If K is observable, then taxes paid would
be a function of {K, R}. This model is formally identical to the standard one when K is the
same for all individuals, there is no variability (ϵ is ﬁxed) and e is not ﬁxed. If everyone
had the same K and a, we would have the standard moral hazard model. With K ﬁxed
(observable), but ϵ variable, individuals' diﬀering in a, and e not ﬁxed, then we have the
standard moral-hazard-cum-adverse-selection model, where both self-selection and in-
centive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. This changes some of the
standard results that have been obtained in models with pure adverse selection. See
Stiglitz and Yun (2013).
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labor, with full separability (of consumption from eﬀort and labor, and
eﬀort and labor from each other), but diﬀering in both the ability to
transform labor and capital into “income,” if one can separately identify
income from labor and from capital,19 optimal taxation involves sepa-
rate non-linear taxation of capital income and labor income, but no
commodity taxation. But even with separability of consumption from
eﬀort and labor, but eﬀort and labor not being separable from each
other, matters are far more complicated. While there would still be no
indirect taxation, in general, taxes would not just be a function of total
income.20
Of course, some individuals have larger endowments of wealth. If
such wealth were observable, a utilitarian would want to impose a
lump-sum tax on it. If the supply of that wealth were elastic—parents'
transfers to children could be aﬀected by the taxes imposed on the
transfer or assets or the after-tax income generated—then there might
be a trade-oﬀ, with higher tax rates generating more tax revenue but
leading to less accumulation and transfer of wealth. Even a Rawlsian
would impose a tax that was< 100%. It may be that the actual value of
the wealth transfer is not observable, but only the income generated by
it. Then there is no presumption that the optimal tax (whatever the
social welfare function) on the income generated by that wealth would
be taxed at zero. Quite the contrary: there is a presumption that it
would be taxed, and possibly at high rates.
2.1. Taxing capital goods and rents
Moreover, the result that one does not want to tax the returns to
individuals is often confused with not taxing the returns to particular
assets or corporations. If land is inelastically supplied, there is nothing
in our analysis that undermines the conventional result that one would
want to tax the returns on that asset at a very high rate (100%) (George,
1879).21 The price of the asset would fall, to reﬂect the tax. Indeed,
more recent results—extending the overlapping generations model as
exposited in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) to include land as an as-
set—note that since land crowds out capital, a tax on land leads to a
higher steady-state level of capital (per capita) and thus to higher levels
of income.22 All that the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem said was that (under
the stipulated conditions) one should not tax the returns received by the
individual.
2.2. Risk
We ignored uncertainty, as did most of the subsequent literature.
This was an important omission. In a world in which there are imperfect
risk markets, Domar and Musgrave (1944)23 had already shown that an
income tax with appropriate loss oﬀsets could encourage risk taking.
With, say, expensing of capital goods, the government entered as a si-
lent partner. The government was in a better position to absorb risk
than the ﬁrm or individual: it could spread risk over all of society
(Arrow and Lind, 1970, 2014).24 If the tax rate was τ, the government
picked up τ per cent of the costs, taking in turn τ percent of the returns.
The expected marginal return per dollar invested was thus unchanged.
But taking account of risk, the tax actually led to more investment.25 A
utilitarian government would again want to impose a capital income
tax. Indeed, it would be part of Pareto eﬃcient taxation.
2.3. Extending Atkinson-Stiglitz
There were two natural extensions to our analysis: to ask whether
there were more general conditions under which commodity taxation
was not necessary, and to ask whether the result remained true with an
income tax that was not the optimal non-linear tax, e.g. with an (op-
timal) linear income tax. Deaton (1979, 1981) showed that with an
optimal linear income tax, weak separability between goods and leisure,
together with linear Engel curves for goods, are suﬃcient conditions for
no indirect taxation. But when these restrictive conditions are not sa-
tisﬁed, in general commodity taxation is required, even with an optimal
linear tax (Stiglitz (2009a), a revision and extension of Stiglitz
(1976a)).26 Gauthier and Laroque (2009) provide a more general ac-
count of the role of separability in optimal taxation and expenditure.
Sections 3 and 4 explore some of the more general results (some, as we
note, already in the literature) in which separability suﬃces to ensure that
commodity taxation is not needed with an optimal income tax. Later
sections show that, in particular, an interest income tax is needed.
3. The basic model
We begin our discussion with the standard model, with two types of
individuals, diﬀering in ability, but having the same utility function,
reviewing the results of Stiglitz (1982a), as a prelude to the subsequent
analysis. The ith individual faces a before-tax wage (output per hour) of
wi, and thus, in the absence of taxation, his budget constraint is simply
∑ =C w Lj ij i i (1)
where Cij=the ith individual's consumption of good j, all goods are
normalized to have a price of unity, Li=number of hours worked by the
ith individual. Neither wi nor Li is observable, but the product is—the
product being the ith individual's income, Yi=wi Li. The ith individual
receives utility from consuming goods and disutility from work:







, U is quasi-concave, and Ci represents the ith in-
dividual's consumption vector: Ci= (Ci1,…,Cij,…). Assume the govern-
ment imposes a tax, T, as a function of income: Ti= T(Yi). The in-
dividual's consumption now is his income minus his tax payment,
ΣCij=Yi− T(Yi). The individual maximizes his utility subject to his
budget constraint:
∑ ≤ −CU L s t C w L T w Lmax ( , ) . . ( )i
C Y
i
i j ij i i i i{ ,, }i i, (3)
19 Note that for small businesses, tax authorities cannot separately identify income
from capital and labor. At best they can impute income from capital.
20 Let W=wage income, C= capital income, and T be total taxes paid. The optimal
tax function T(W, C) is not of the form T=T(W+C).
21 For a more modern rendition, see Arnott and Stiglitz (1979, 1981).
22 This is a result obtained earlier in models with money and capital accumulation (see,
e.g. Shell et al. (1969)). For more recent and general results, see Stiglitz (2015, 2017).
23 Their analysis was put into modern expected utility form by Stiglitz (1969b). See
also Piketty and Saez (2013) who explain how if there is uninsurable uncertainty about
future returns, capital taxation can be viewed as providing insurance against returns. (The
older literature emphasized the importance of loss oﬀsets.)
24 A fuller analysis would address why the government is better able to spread risks
than the market. Well-developed theories based on information asymmetries have ex-
plained imperfections in capital markets and their ability to share risk.
25 Domar and Musgrave (1944) used mean variance analysis. Stiglitz (1969b) showed
that this was true more generally, for risk-averse individuals.
26 It is worth noting, though, that the structure of optimal commodity taxation does
not look like that described by Ramsey (1927) (where tax rates were simply related to
elasticities of demand and supply) or Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). At the same time, one
can still derive a simple formula, given the optimal commodity taxes, for the optimal
linear tax rate, based on an appropriately weighted average of the labor supply elasti-
cities. The optimal tax can be related to a measure of the marginal beneﬁt associated with
inequality reduction (this marginal measure diﬀers from the Atkinson measure, which
identiﬁed how much individuals would be willing to pay to get rid of all inequality.
Obviously, at the margin, there is greater social cost of inequality. Stiglitz (1976a) relates
this to a societal measure of inequality aversion (or risk aversion), obtaining a remarkably




(1 ) where as usual τ is the (in-
come) tax rate, R is the measure of risk (inequality) aversion, sY2 is the variance of income
inequality, g is the share of government revenue spent on public goods, and nu L is a
welfare-weighted average compensated labor supply elasticity. (Earlier, Sheshinski
(1972) analyzed the optimal income tax, but did not derive the above simple expression
for the optimal tax rate. Subsequently, Piketty and Saez (2012) extended these earlier
papers to provide tax formulae based on observable suﬃcient statistics.)
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yielding the ﬁrst-order condition (assuming diﬀerentiability, etc.):











The left-hand side is the individual's marginal rate of substitution. The
right-hand side is the after-tax marginal return to working an extra hour.
The problem of the government concerned with Pareto eﬃciency27
is to maximize the utility of, say, individuals of type 2, subject to (a)
individuals of type 1 having at least a given level of utility and (b)
raising a given amount of revenue. It does this by oﬀering two {C, Y}
packages, one of which will be chosen by the ﬁrst group, the other of
which will be chosen by the second group.28 We write
= ≡( )C C CU L U V Y( , ) , ( , ).i i ii i i Yw i iii The government thus solves the
following program:
CV Ymax ( , )
C C Y Y
2
{ , , }
2
2
1 2 1, 2 (5)
s.t. ≥CV Y U( , )11 1 1;V2(C2,Y2)≥ V2(C1,Y1); V1(C1,Y1)≥ V1(C2,Y2)
(the self-selection constraints)and = − + − ≥R Y C N Y C N R( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2
(the revenue constraint)where Ci= ∑jCij, the ith consumer's aggregate
consumption, R is government revenue; R is the revenue requirement,
and Ni the number of individuals of type i. If we let μ be the shadow
price associated with the utility constraint, λi be the shadow prices
associated with the self-selection constraints, and γ be the shadow price
associated with the revenue constraint, then without loss of generality,
the Lagrangian can be written as29:
= + − + −
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Then, the ﬁrst order conditions are:
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It is easy to show that at most one of the two self-selection con-
straints will be binding. We focus on the case where λ1=0 and λ2 > 0:
only the second self-selection constraint is binding. Note that the
standard case of optimal utilitarian tax policy, where the government
maximizes ∑iNiVi implies that μ=1.30
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We have formulated the problem as directly a control problem on
{Ci, Li}, but the solution can be implemented by a simple non-linear tax
system, i.e. individual 1 is confronted with indirect taxes giving relative
prices corresponding to the LHS of Eq. (9a), a marginal income tax rate
given by the LHS of Eq. (9b), and a non-linear income tax, giving the
equivalent of a lump-sum tax combined with a linear income tax with
marginal rate given by Eq. (9b) yielding utility level for individual 1 of
U1 (V1*). Similarly, the high-ability individual has no marginal income
tax or consumption tax, but faces a non-linear income tax giving the
equivalent of a lump-sum tax yielding V2*, where {V1*, V2*} are the
utility levels given by the solution to the optimal tax problem. Thus, we
have the familiar result:
Proposition 1a. There should be no distortionary taxation on the
individual with the highest ability while the labor supply of the less-
able individual is distorted.
This result goes beyond that of Mirrlees (1971) which said that the
top marginal income tax rate should be zero.31 Eq. (8a) says that there
should be no commodity taxation on the high ability as well.32
Fig. 1 provides a simple diagrammatic illustration with a single
consumption good. In Fig. 1A, the two types are quite diﬀerent, so
diﬀerent that the high ability does not want to mimic the low ability if
we impose non-distortionary taxation. Point E1* is the point on the low-
ability indiﬀerence curve U1* which maximizes revenues, i.e. in which
there is no distortionary taxation, so the slope of the indiﬀerence curve
is unity. (Government revenue is just the diﬀerence between Y and C).
Knowing R1, the revenue raised from the low-ability individuals (or, as
illustrated in this ﬁgure, the subsidy provided to them) and the required
government revenue, we know the revenue that has to be raised from
the high-ability individuals. V2* is the highest level of utility of the high
ability consistent with raising that revenue, E2* the maximal revenue-
raising point on the corresponding indiﬀerence curve. It is clear that the
high-ability individual does not want to imitate the low-ability in-
dividual. But Fig. 1B shows the more typical case, where he would. The
maximal revenue consistent with U1 being equal to U1 requires a suf-
ﬁciently high tax on the high ability that he would mimic the low risk.
In the ﬁgure, we depict the tax on the high ability that would make him
indiﬀerent between mimicking, and we assume it does not suﬃce. For
the self-selection constraint to be satisﬁed, E1* now must entail lower
levels of income and consumption (labor supply) and lower tax rev-
enues from the low ability, and hence a higher level of revenues raised
from the high ability. At the optimum, the high ability is just indiﬀerent
to imitating the low.
The interpretation of Eq. (9a) is, however, somewhat more subtle.
For simplicity, denote
27 The notion of Pareto-eﬃcient tax structure is a slight generalization of the “op-
timum” tax analysis of Mirrlees and Diamond and Mirrlees. Pareto-eﬃcient tax structures
are those (given the admissible set of taxes and the required public revenue) which are
such that no one can be better oﬀ without making someone worse oﬀ. We identify
properties of Pareto-eﬃcient tax structures that hold regardless of the social welfare
function. See, e.g. Stiglitz (1982a, 1987) and Brito et al. (1990).
28 Obviously, the government can oﬀer a continuum of {C, Y} packages (i.e., an entire
tax function), but at most two will be chosen, and therefore we need be concerned with at
most two.
29 Recall that Ci (bold) represents the vector of consumption by the ith individual, Ci
represents the total value of consumption of the ith individual, valued at producer prices
(unity.)
30 With U1 becoming, in eﬀect, an endogenous variable.
31 See also Sadka (1976), Seade (1977), and (for an overview) Tuomala (1990). Saez
(2001), following Mirrlees (1971), shows that these results are not robust to a distribution
with no top income (e.g. a Pareto tail) and derives simple asymptotic results. See also
Diamond (1998). But the Pareto tail is used as a good approximation of a description of the
probability distribution of the tail. There is, in practice, an identiﬁable person with the
top income. Thus, we would have no problem in the United States identifying who that
person is (assuming honest reporting of income), and setting a top marginal tax rate for
that individual at zero. That income will be going up over time—as the incomes of all
individuals will be changing, implying a change in the optimal structure. But there is no
reason to impose a distortionary tax on that individual simply because we could conceive
of there being a higher-income individual.
32 This result does not depend on separability of the utility function.
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= Cα MRS Y( , )jki ijk 1 1
i.e., i's marginal rate of substitution between j and k at the bundle {Ci,









and it immediately follows
that αjk1− αjk2= {γ[1− αjk2]}/{γ+ b}. The denominator of the pre-
ceding expression is positive. In the case of separability, the marginal
rate of substitution between j and k is unaﬀected by the amount of
leisure, so αjk1= αjk2, which in turn implies αjk1= αjk2= 1, thus es-
tablishing:
Proposition 1b. There should be no commodity taxation on either
high- or low-ability individuals if leisure and consumption are
separable.
Whether commodity j should be taxed (relative to k) depends simply
on the impact of an increase in leisure on the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between commodities j and k. This property that has nothing
to do with Ramsey's focus on deadweight loss, but tax structure is re-
lated to the deadweight loss associated with the self-selection con-
straints that come into play if government needs to raise a given rev-
enue and cares about distribution, but is in an environment in which
governments cannot tell who is able and who is not. The self-selection
constraints that the government employs to achieve fair taxation create
ﬁrst-order distortions. Commodity taxation can, under certain condi-
tions, reduce the force of those distortions.
The intuition is simple: consider a good that is complementary with
leisure. If a high-ability individual tries to mimic a low-level individual,
he has more leisure, and his demand for that good will accordingly be
higher. Hence, taxing that good and using the proceeds to subsidize a
good that is a substitute for leisure will make mimicking the low-ability
individual less attractive. With a weakened self-selection constraint, the
low-ability individual can work more, moving along his indiﬀerence
curve—and in doing so generate more revenue for the government.
Thus, the utility of both individuals can be increased and still satisfy the
revenue constraint: indirect taxation is a Pareto improvement.
However, if there is separability, then the levels of consumption of the
goods are identical when the high ability imitates the low ability, and
hence there is no way to use diﬀerential taxation to weaken the self-
selection constraint.
There is another intuition that may prove helpful. In the case of
separability, where Vi= Vi(ϕ(Ci),Li), one can think of ϕ itself as an
aggregate consumption good. Individuals take their wage income and
buy “ϕ”. We know from Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) that we want
production eﬃciency.33 Productive eﬃciency in producing φ implies
no commodity taxation.
3.1. Taxation of interest income
An immediate implication of these results is that in the case where
consumption in diﬀerent periods is separable from leisure — typical of
many of the simpliﬁed models explored in the macroeconomic litera-
ture — there should be no interest income taxation.
There is no strong presumption whether in the absence of
separability there should be an interest income tax or subsidy. Consider,
for instance, the standard life cycle formulation (dropping for the mo-
ment subscripts describing the individual, and simplifying by assuming
consumption is uni-dimensional).
= + + +U u C L u C( , ) ( ),t t t t t t1 1 (10)
where there is time separability, but not separability between con-
sumption and leisure and where Ct is consumption of the individual
when he is young and working and Ct+1 is consumption in retirement.
Then the marginal rate of substitution between second period con-







. It follows that:
Proposition 2.With the time separable utility function (Eq. (10)), if an
increase in leisure increases the marginal utility of consumption in the
ﬁrst period, i.e. if leisure and consumption are complements, then there
should be an interest income tax. Conversely, if an increase in leisure
decreases the marginal utility of consumption in the ﬁrst period, i.e. if
they are substitutes, then there should be an interest income subsidy.
Either is plausible and individuals may diﬀer.
The intuition provided earlier helps understand what is going on.
We want to make it more expensive (less advantageous) for the high-
ability person to pretend to be the low-ability person. In doing so, he
increases his leisure. Skiing is a complement to leisure, so we want to
tax skis; household help is a substitute for leisure, so we want to sub-
sidize domestic help. High income people who work long hours with
high savings rates, in anticipation of an enjoyable retirement, are evi-
dencing complementarity between leisure and consumption; a subsidy
on the return to savings increases the cost of cutting back on savings (as
would happen if the high ability pretends to be a low ability).34
3.2. Atmospheric externalities
Still another generalization that is easy to incorporate into the
model is atmospheric externalities,35 i.e. there is some variable B (for
Bad) which is a function of the aggregate consumption variables. Both
production and utility can be adversely aﬀected by B:
= <CV V L B V( , , ) where 0ii i Bi (11)
and Q= F(K,L,B), where FB < 0. It is useful if we reformulate our self-
selection constraints, to represent the self-selection constraint as:
≥C CV L B V L B( , , ) ( , , )2 2 2 2 1 2 (12a)
where L2 is the labor a type 2 individual would have to put forth to
imitate the income of a type 1 individual, i.e.,





Fig. 1. (a) The required revenue R can be raised in a Pareto-eﬃcient way that gives individual 1 utility U1 by a non-linear income tax (dotted line) which confronts both types with zero
marginal tax rates. At E2*, high-ability individuals do not want to mimic low ability individuals.
(b) The more normal case: at maximal revenue associated with U1, point E1′, we can identify the maximal revenue we can extract from high ability, by drawing type 2's indiﬀerence curve
through E1′. The maximal revenue corresponds to point E2′. It is insuﬃcient to raise required revenue R . We thus have to impose a higher tax on 2, lowering his utility, which result in his
mimicking 1 if we had left 1 at E1′. We force 1 to work less, moving him to E1*, raising less from the low-ability types, necessitating an even higher tax on the high ability. At the (Pareto)
eﬃcient tax, type 2 is indiﬀerent between his optimal point (E2*) and the low ability's optimal point E1*. The Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be implemented through a tax that is linear,
with slope equal to that of type 1 at E1* (i.e. eﬀectively a demi-grant plus a positive tax rate), then at some income level above Y1* but below Y2*, a high (inﬁnite) tax rate, and then above
a critical threshold somewhat below Y2*, a zero marginal tax rate. There are many tax schedules that can implement the Pareto eﬃcient allocation. This is not so when there are a
continuum of types, for then we have to be sensitive to marginal tax rates at every income level.
33 Later, we will qualify this result. See also Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971, 1972).
34 It should be clear from the structure of the analysis that if individuals supplied labor
at diﬀerent dates, so Ui=Ui(Ct, Ct+1, … CT, Lt, Lt+1, … LT), but the utility function
remained separable between consumption and leisure (work) Ui= ui (Ct, Ct+1, …
CT)+ vi (Lt, Lt+1, … LT) it would remain true that no interest income tax should be
imposed, though, in general, the tax an individual would pay on wage income in one year
would depend in wage income earned in other years.
35 An atmospheric externality is an externality the value of which depends on ag-
gregate consumption. In the notation below C, is the vector aggregate consumption of all
commodities.
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where ν is the ratio of the productivity of the low ability individual to
the high ability individual, assumed now ﬁxed. Then we have:
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(13)
where […] represents the derivative of the Lagrangian in the absence of
externalities. There are three additional terms: {A} represents the direct
consumption externality; {B} represents the production externality; and
{C} represents the impact on the self-selection constraint.
In the case of a separable utility function, which can take on the
form of36:
= −CV v L Z B( , ) ( ),i (14a)
the third term disappears, and there are only the direct externality ef-
fects of the kind that have been analyzed by Pigou (1920) and Sandmo
(1975). The results for Eq. (14a) are obvious: because of the structure of
preferences, the level of B can't aﬀect any choices made by anyone, and
therefore can't aﬀect the structure of taxation. However, in the case of
Eq. (14a), the very presence of self-selection constraints changes the
social marginal valuation of consumption (in eﬀect, the shadow price
on diﬀerent consumption goods). The additional terms A and B re-
present alterations to these shadow prices, as opposed to the market
prices. Moreover, the presence of atmospheric externalities (under Eq.
(14a)) does not aﬀect choices, and so we can ignore the indirect income
eﬀects arising from B, though obviously, not those arising from the
taxation of labor or goods.
Alternatively, separability could take the form of
= −V v C B Z L( , ) ( ).i (14b)
The results for Eq. (14b) follow directly from our earlier analysis. A
change in B simply shifts the common utility function for goods.
Proposition 3A. If labor is separable from consumption then a
straightforward Pigouvian tax/subsidy is optimal. If the externality is
separable from consumption and labor (but consumption and labor are
not necessarily separable), then a ﬁrst-best Pigouvian tax/
subsidy—over and above the shadow prices (prices with optimal
commodity taxes/subsidies)—is desirable.
In other words, in these cases, the complicated formulae underlying
the literature on corrective taxation that focus on interactions between
the corrective taxes and other taxes are not relevant. What has been
called “ﬁrst best Pigouvian taxation” –where the tax is imposed to re-
ﬂect marginal harm, is desirable. (Kaplow, 2006a). On the other hand,
if the utility functions are not separable, simple Pigouvian corrective
taxation is not appropriate, but the deviations from simple Pigouvian
corrective taxation do not depend (just) on indirect revenue eﬀects, but
(also) on the impacts on self-selection constraints.
Proposition 3B. With non-separable utility functions, Pigouvian
corrective taxation has to be modiﬁed to take account not just of the
second-order eﬀects on government revenue but of the ﬁrst-order
eﬀects on the self-selection restraints.37
In particular, if those with more leisure are more sensitive to the
quality of the environment than those with less leisure, then the
(Pareto) optimal level of consumption of negative-externality-gen-
erating consumption is higher, because by increasing the level of the
atmospheric externality, it enhances the ease of separation.
3.3. Public goods
The previous subsections' analysis can be directly applied to public
goods. A public good, like a public bad, enters everyone's utility, and
since we are assuming all individuals have the same preferences:
Vi= Vi(Ci,L,G) Assume the production function is of the form
∑iCi+G= ∑iwiLi, and let γ now represent the overall resource con-
straint. Then optimal G entails:
∑ + − =μ N V λ V V γ( )i i i Gi G G2 2 2
In the utilitarian formulation, μi = 1, for all i. With separability (of
either the form of Eq. (14a) or Eq. (14b), with G replacing B), the sum of
the marginal utilities of the public good equals the marginal social cost,
γ. But γ is normally itself inﬂuenced by the self-selection constraint.
Consider ﬁrst the case where neither self-selection constraint is binding




∑ =( )N V / 1i i Gi ddCViij : we obtain the standard result that the sum of the
marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of transforma-
tion, here unity. But more generally, so long as we have separability, we
have ∑ =( )N V / 1i i Gi ddCViij : Even with distortionary taxation, the Sa-
muelson rule holds. In a sense, the result should not be too surprising.
With unconstrained optimal non-linear taxation, there is no distortion
associated with the top person, and with separability, the self-selection
constraint is eﬀectively not binding. Then there is, in eﬀect, no marginal
distortion arising from raising additional revenue—even though taxes
are, as a whole, distortionary. In the absence of separability, the sum of
the marginal rates of substitution may be either greater or less than the
marginal rate of transformation. It depends on the eﬀect of G and of the
numeraire (the “private good”) on the self-selection constraint. In the
case of separability between G and {goods and labor}, G doesn't aﬀect
the self-selection constraint, but the private consumption good may
either tighten the constraint (leading to lower consumption and a
higher valuation of the private good for the low ability individual) or
loosen it.38 Note that since diﬀerent public goods may enter into pre-
ferences diﬀerently, for some goods the sum of the MRS's may be less
than the MRT, for others greater.
4. Extension to many periods with overlapping generations
If we are to meaningfully analyze the desirability of an interest in-
come tax, we have to do so within a model in which the return to ca-
pital is determined endogenously. We do so in the standard overlapping
generations model. Each generation is assumed to live for two periods,
working in the ﬁrst, and consuming in both periods. Within each
36 Obviously, it can also be fully separable, and the analysis does not require additive
separability.
37 Sandmo (1975) provided the classic modern discussion of optimal taxation in the
presence of externalities, but he conducted the analysis in the standard Ramsey-Diamond-
Mirrlees framework with no income tax. The contribution here is simply to add the self-
selection constraint. Kaplow (2006a) analyzes the problem posed here, using a very clever
approach which he applies to the analysis of public goods and to the general problem of
indirect taxation discussed above (Kaplow (1996, 2006b)), which highlights the role of
separability. He shows that if there were a diﬀerential tax on commodities, there would
always exist a perturbation in the tax function that would lead to a Pareto improvement.
In some respects, his result is stronger than that here, for he shows that diﬀerential
commodity taxation is not desirable regardless of whether the imposed income tax is
optimal or not, so long as it is possible to make any perturbation in the income tax function.
(footnote continued)
The last observation, though, is critical. For instance, Stiglitz (1976a, 2009a) considers
diﬀerential commodity taxation in the presence of an optimal linear income tax. There are
both administrative, economic, and political reasons for a linear, or a piece-wise linear,
tax system, implying that arbitrary deviations from (quasi-) linearity may not be feasible
or will entail costs not incorporated into the analysis. Kaplow's analysis focuses on the
case of separability between consumption and labor Eq. (14b).
38 Boadway and Keen (1993) provider a fuller analysis of the optimal provision of
public goods. Note that the question of whether the sum of the MRS's is greater or less
than the marginal rate of transformation does not translate directly into whether the
supply of public goods with distortionary taxation is less than or greater than with lump-
sum taxation, since this is a matter of general equilibrium, in which all the variables are
endogenous. See Atkinson and Stern (1974) for a discussion of the matter in the context of
the Ramsey-Diamond-Mirrlees model.
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generation, there are two types (the able and the less able), but the
government does not know who is who. The utility function of the ith
type in the tth generation is denoted by Vti(Cit,t,Cit,t+1,Li, t) where Cit,t is
the tth generation's vector of consumption during the ﬁrst (working)
period, and Cit,t+1is the tth generation's consumption during the second
(retirement) period of this life. As before, the self-selection constraint
can be written as:
≥C C C CV L V L( , , ) ( , , ).t,t t,t+ t,t t,t+t t t t2 2 1 1 1 12 2, 2 2,
Output at the time t is given by a neoclassical production function of
the form Qt= F (Kt,Et), where Et= v N1L1, t+N2L2, t is the eﬀective
labor supply. If there are no constraints on the government's ability to
use social security or debt policy to control the capital stock (see
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) then the only macro-constraints that need
to be taken into account are the period resource constraints, which we
write as
∑ ∑= + + + =+ −Q K N C N C G F K E( , )t t i i it t i i it t t t t1 , 1, (15)
where we have assumed that capital wears out each period. Forming
the Lagrangian as before39, but with separate constraints for each
period (including for the self-selection constraint and the resource
constraint Eq. (15) that replaces the budget constraint), and diﬀer-
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where γt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the tth period gov-
ernment budget constraint Eq. (15). By diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian
with respect to Kt, we obtain







= FK(Kt+1,Et+1)= the (gross) marginal return on capital.
Proposition 4a. In the overlapping generations model with two types
of labor at every t, there should be no interest income tax on the savings
of the high ability individuals, a zero marginal income tax, and no
commodity taxation; while, as in the static model, low ability
individuals face distortionary taxation on labor, commodities, and
savings. With separability between leisure and consumption, there
should be no commodity or interest taxation on the low ability.
Without separability, there should be commodity and interest income
taxes (or subsidies).
Rather than focusing on Pareto optimality, we could have max-
imized intertemporal social welfare, say using a utilitarian social wel-
fare function: max ∑tδt(N1 Vt1+N2 Vt2), where the welfare of future
generations are discounted at the rate δ (δ is the pure rate of social time






(16a)–(16d) and (17) then imply that the economy with distortionary
taxation converges to the modiﬁed golden rule, where the rate of return
equals the pure rate of social time preference. With separability, both
individuals' MRS is equal to that rate, but in general, the low ability
individual's may not be.
Proposition 4b. In the steady state of the overlapping generations
utilitarian optimal tax problem, with (and, in general, only with)
separability, the rate of interest (both the producer and consumer
rate of interest, for both the low and high ability individuals) equals the
pure rate of social time preference.
4.1. Public and private investment
It is easy to extend the analysis to incorporate public as well as
private investment. Let Kg represent public investment, Kp private in-
vestment, and let the production function now be Q= C+ Kg+ Kp= F
(Kg,Kp,E), where C is aggregate consumption. It immediately follows
that FKg= FKp.
Proposition 4c. Pareto eﬃcient taxation-cum-expenditures requires
that the return on public capital equal the return on private capital,
which asymptotically, is just equal to the pure rate of time preference.
These results are clearly parallel to those of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971), who argued for production eﬃciency.
5. Distributive eﬀects of tax and expenditure policy
The analysis so far has established that the results derived earlier,
both with respect to taxation and public production, in simple partial
equilibrium models hold more generally in a dynamic, overlapping
generations, general equilibrium model; it has shown that Ramsey's
analysis provides little guidance either for the design of eﬃcient or
redistributive commodity taxation; it has conﬁrmed that the Diamond-
Mirrlees result on the desirability of eﬃciency holds in this setting; and
it has shown that the analysis can be extended to incorporate ex-
ternalities, with modiﬁcations from Pigouvian corrective taxation based
not on Ramsey-like indirect impacts on tax revenues but on impacts on
self-selection constraints.
Unfortunately, several of these results are not robust, if government
tax or expenditure policies can aﬀect the distribution of income in ways
which cannot be directly oﬀset by tax policy: in our model, relative
wages, v. If the two types of labor are not perfect substitutes, then in
general v will be aﬀected by levels of consumption of each of the goods
and labor supply of the two types of labor. Optimal tax theory is pre-
dicated on the inability to observe either output per hour or the number
of hours worked, because if one could do so, one could infer ability, and
thus impose lump sum taxation.40 Thus, dropping the time subscripts
(focusing on the basic model of Section 3), the ﬁrst order condition for
C2j is:
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Any tax or expenditure which changes v aﬀects the self-selection
constraint, and hence all of the previous conditions are altered. Note
that <∂∂ 0LV
2
. Proposition 5 follows directly.
Proposition 5. If relative wages are aﬀected by consumption levels of
diﬀerent commodities by the highly skilled, then there should be
indirect taxation on the highly skilled; if relative wages are aﬀected
by levels of diﬀerent commodities by the low-skilled, then there should
be indirect taxation on the low-skilled even with separability between
consumption and labor; if labor supply by highly skilled individuals
aﬀects relative wages, then high-wage individuals should face a
marginal income tax (or subsidy). Any change in Cij or Li that
improves the distribution of income (i.e. increases the low-ability
individual's wage relative to that of the high ability) improves
39 Where μ it is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint ≥V Vti ti, μ1,
0= 1.
40 Of course, that would not be the case if output per hour was itself a function of some
unobservable variable besides ability, e.g. eﬀort or education. We cannot pursue these
ideas here.
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welfare, and hence taxes should be designed to reﬂect this.
This means that the consumption of unskilled labor-intensive goods
should be encouraged (their consumption prices reduced). In particular,
we know from Samuelson's (1948) analysis of the two-factor two-good
international trade model, where output in each sector is a function of
skilled and unskilled labor, that a movement along the production
possibilities schedule (with ﬁxed inputs of skilled and unskilled labor)
towards the production of the unskilled-intensive good leads to an in-
crease in relative wages of unskilled workers. The implications for labor
supply (taxation of labor income) are, in this model where there are no
other factors of production, disquieting (Stiglitz, 1982b). Since in such a
model, the two types of labor have to be complements (F12 > 0), an
increase in skilled labor has to increase the relative wage of the un-
skilled. This means that we have to encourage more labor supply by the
skilled (from what it would be in the absence of an eﬀect on relative
wages), i.e. the top marginal tax rate should be negative. This result,
however, is not general: if we have a three factor production function
(output is a function of the two types of labor and land), then skilled
and unskilled labor can be substitutes, in which case the top marginal
tax rate should be positive, in contrast to the standard result in optimal
(income) taxation, that it should be zero. (See Mirrlees (1971) and Saez
(2001).)
Similarly, the optimal Pigouvian tax formulae for correction of ex-
ternalities and the formulae for the optimal supply of public goods have
to be corrected for induced wage eﬀects: the externality or public good
may have an eﬀect on relative wages, and thus on the self-selection
constraints. The required modiﬁcations in the optimal formulae are
straightforward. Note, in particular, that the simplifying results that
hold with separability (that the eﬀects on self-selection constraints can
be ignored) no longer hold.
5.1. Production eﬃciency
Soon after Diamond and Mirrlees established their eﬃciency re-
sult—that optimal commodity taxation should ensure production
eﬃciency—Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971, 1972) showed that this would
not be so in general, in particular if there were restricted taxation, for
instance if there were rents (pure proﬁts) that could not be taxed at
100%, or if there were some factors or goods that had to be taxed at the
same rate. A direct implication of the Diamond Mirrlees eﬃciency re-
sult was that it was not optimal to impose tariﬀs. Correspondingly, an
implication of the Dasgupta-Stiglitz results was that it was often de-
sirable to impose tariﬀs (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1975). Not surprisingly,
the same result holds in the current context. Here, the critical issue is
distribution. In the previous paragraphs, we assumed that government
could not directly control v by the imposition of (optimal) indirect taxes
on the labor supply of skilled and unskilled labor—an assumption we
noted that was fully consistent with the standard optimal tax model,
where only the product of hours worked and wages per hour is ob-
servable. But even if the wages received by or paid to any individual are
not observable to the government, the government can aﬀect the re-
lative wage paid to unskilled workers.
Thus, if the government imposes a tariﬀ on the relative price of the
unskilled labor-intensive good, it increases v, relaxing the self-selection
constraint.41 The beneﬁt of relaxing that constraint has to be compared
with the cost of the resulting ineﬃciency, which is captured by the
impact on the resource constraint of an increase in p, the domestic
producer price, over the international price, which we assume is unity.
With international trade,42 the resource constraint can be written
∑jXj(p;L1,L2)= ∑i∑jCij, where Xj is the output of the jth commodity, a
function of relative prices and the aggregate supplies of the two types of
labor. Specifying {L1, L2} determines the production possibilities curve.
Specifying p determines where on the production possibilities curve the
economy operates. In Fig. 2, AB measures the ineﬃciency at the equi-
librium of aggregate consumption of one good in terms of the other
good: how much more aggregate consumption could have been had a
tariﬀ not been imposed. We impose a tariﬀ on the unskilled labor in-
tensive good, which increases unskilled relative wages. The optimal

























X1 (where MRT stands for the marginal rate of
transformation). The ﬁrst term is the beneﬁt from the relaxation of the
self-selection constraint; the second term the resource cost of the tariﬀ.
There are similarly many ways within the closed economy to show
the (potential) desirability of distortionary production taxation in a
world where we cannot separately tax skilled and unskilled work. For
instance, assume we have two sectors in the economy, each producing
all the goods (a dual economy), one of which is more unskilled labor
intensive. For each we have a transformation function
=C C G L L( , , , , ) 0k kk k k k1 2 1 2J , where the jth element of Ck1 is output of
consumption good j in the kth sector, so C1jk+ C2jk=total production
of commodity j in the kth sector, which in equilibrium must be equal to
the total consumption of that product. We can diﬀerently tax the con-
sumption of good j depending on the producer. Doing so is equivalent to
imposing a producer tax. In our direct control problem, where we
specify the level of consumption of each good by each type of in-
dividual, we now specify the level of consumption of each good by
sector. Since what we are concerned about is relative wages, what
matters is aggregate consumption across the two individuals of output
from the two sectors, which can variously be thought of as the advanced
or large corporate sector, and the informal or small and medium-sized
enterprise (SME) sector. In equilibrium, there are additional constraints
imposed by the fact that while the government cannot observe wages,
individuals do, and they allocate themselves so that the wages in the
two sectors for each type of labor are the same. (A more realistic model
would incorporate labor market frictions.) The Lagrangian now needs
to be rewritten, with additional terms representing resource constraints
γ [k kJ − 0]
44; and the free labor mobility constraint, ensuring equal
marginal products of labor in the two sectors relative to, say, the nu-
meraire, 0: −ζ [ / / ]i L oa L oaa ui iJ J J J , where the superscript a stands for the
advanced sector, and u for the less advanced sector, and /L okk iJ J is the
wage in the kth sector of type i labor in terms of the numeraire, denoted
“o”. The optimization equation (the derivative of the Lagrangian) for
Cijk now contains an extra set of terms, one focusing on the eﬀect of the
consumption of the jth good from the kth production sector on the self-
selection constraint, another simplifying the resource constraint itself,
the third embedding the free movement of labor across sectors. Pro-
duction of a good in one production process may aﬀect the self-selec-
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With an increase in production a of, say, good j in the advanced and
SME sectors having diﬀerent eﬀects on the demand for unskilled labor,
and thus aﬀecting the value of ν and thus the self-selection constraint,
there is a strong presumption against production eﬃciency.45
41 See also Naito (1999)
42 Assuming all goods are tradable.





44 Obviously, without loss of generality, we can drop the term −γk0
45 Production eﬃciency requires that the marginal rate of transformation of all goods
that are produced in both sectors be the same in the two sectors, i.e. J aj /J am= Juj / Jum,
where j and m are any two goods.
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Proposition 6. In general, production eﬃciency is not desirable. If
there are two (or more) sectors of the economy with diﬀerent
production functions, and in particular, diﬀerent responses of relative
demands for diﬀerent types of labor (and thus relative wages) to
demands for diﬀerent goods, then production eﬃciency is not desirable.
In particular, distortionary tariﬀs are in general desirable.
Distortionary production tax in eﬀect reduces the burden imposed
on distortionary consumption taxes. The freedom that Diamond and
Mirrlees had in setting taxes on skilled and unskilled labor—diﬀerent
factors of production that to them were observable—meant that these
distributive eﬀects could always be “undone” by changes in factor
taxation. The assumption here is that this is not possible: if we could
observe the type of labor (skilled or unskilled), we could observe who
was providing that type of labor, and thus infer directly the type of the
individual, and thus impose lump sum taxation.46
5.2. Extending the life-cycle model
In this sub-section, we extend the analysis of the previous sections to
include distributive eﬀects of taxation within a life-cycle model. As
before, we assume that the two types of labor are not perfect sub-
stitutes, i.e., the aggregate production is of the form Qt= F(Kt,L1t,L2t)
with wi, t= FLi, t, where Qt=Kt+1+ ∑i∑jCijt. Now, relative wages de-
pend on investment. If we assume constant returns to scale,
= = ( )v Φ ,t ww LK LKtt tt tt12, 1 2 . Given this reformulation, we can again form the
Lagrangian, obtaining the same ﬁrst order conditions for Cit, t+1 and Cit,
t+1 as before but now there is an extra term in each equation to reﬂect
the eﬀect of relative wages on the self-selection constraint through K, so
= ++ + + + + + +γ F γ λ L dVdL C C vL
dv
dK
( , , )t K t t t
it




1, 1 1, 2 1 (18)
In turn dlnv
dK
=(F13/F1− F23/F2). While constant returns to scale
implies F13+ F23+ F33= 0, there are no implications about dlnvdK . If, for
instance, capital is a substitute for unskilled labor and a complement to
skilled labor, then an increase in K decreases v. Substituting into the
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where C2jt, t is the high ability individual of generation t's consumption
of commodity j in time t, C2jt, t+1 is that at time t+ 1. A similar cal-
culation applies to type 1 individuals. So too, consider two types of
capital goods, say Kg and Kp, using the same amount of resources to
construct, Qt= Kgt+1+Kpt+1+ ΣΣCijt, so production eﬃciency re-
quires FKgt = FKpt, the marginal returns to these two types of capital
should be the same. Proposition 7a thus immediately follows.
Proposition 7a. If the level of capital aﬀects relative wages, the
marginal rate of substitution is in general not equal to the marginal
rate of transformation even for the high-ability individual; even in the
presence of separability, it may be optimal to have an interest income
tax or subsidy on both high- and low-ability individuals. Production
eﬃciency is not desirable if diﬀerent kinds of capital aﬀect the
distribution of income diﬀerently.
Increases in capital (and in diﬀerent types of capital goods) change
wage inequality. We impose a tax on interest income if an increase in K
increases wage inequality, i.e. if capital (like robots) lowers unskilled
wage relative to skilled wages.47 The reason we do so is related to how
the self-selection constraints are aﬀected. More generally, whether
there should be a tax or subsidy on capital depends on whether an in-
crease in the capital stock increases or decreases relative wages, i.e.,
makes the self-selection constraint more or less binding.48
If we can diﬀerentiate among diﬀerent kinds of capital, i.e. K is a
vector, with some components labor-saving or using for diﬀerent kinds
of labor, then there should be a tax on those kinds of capital goods
which are unskilled labor-saving and a subsidy on those which are
unskilled labor-using. The returns on diﬀerent kinds of capital goods
should, accordingly, diﬀer. There is no reason that the eﬀect on in-
equality of public and private capital goods will be the same. In general,
if government can have more control (directly) in the choice of the
extent to which public capital goods are complementary to unskilled
labor (i.e. increase v), then public capital goods should be advantaged
over private capital goods; the marginal return (“FK”) to public in-
vestment goods should be less than that for private capital goods, and in
a utilitarian dynamic optimal growth model, in steady state, FKg may
thus be< 1/δ.
More generally, the economy's transformation curve can be written
as before as
= =C C K KL L v( , , , , , ) 0, with .t t L
L






Eq. (19) describes an economy in which diﬀerent consumption or
capital goods are produced with diﬀerent production functions. A
movement along the transformation curve changes the relative demand
for highly skilled and low-skilled workers, i.e. aﬀects relative wages.
Now, in general, even the basic formulae for consumption tax (Eq.
(15)), which we have shown hold in the more general overlapping
generations model, have to be changed. Proposition 7b follows.
Fig. 2. By producing at B rather than at E, the economy can consume less than it
otherwise could have. The eﬀective loss in output in terms of good 1 is measured by AB.
46 It is thus conceivable that the government observe the type of labor input, but not the
“name” of the individual providing that type of labor. Especially in the unincorporated
sector, our assumption is more plausible; and so long as there are some sectors of the
economy where the type of labor being provided is unobservable, our results on the
desirability of distortionary production taxation hold.
47 Hicks (1932) deﬁned an innovation as labor saving if at the given levels of inputs the
marginal return to labor is reduced. Labor-saving innovations lead to a reduction in
wages. The vocabulary extends directly to the context here: an increase in capital is
unskilled labor saving if at the given levels of inputs, the marginal return to unskilled
labor decreases. We are particularly concerned here how a change in K aﬀects relative
wages, ν.
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with respect to K.
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Proposition 7b. If relative wages depend on consumption or public
expenditure patterns, then in general, even with separability (i) the rate
of return should not equal the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution, (ii) the rate of return in the public sector should not
equal that in the private one, and (iii) even asymptotically, with
utilitarian intertemporal optimization, it will not equal the pure rate
of time preference.49
Consumption at date t aﬀects the self-selection constraint at date t,
while consumption at date t+ 1 of the same commodity aﬀects the self-
selection constraint at t+ 1. But individuals consume diﬀerent com-
modity bundles; if the elderly on average consume more unskilled
labor-intensive services (e.g. home care), then we want to encourage
individuals to consume more later in life, because that drives up the
relative wages of unskilled workers, reducing before-tax inequality and
the extent to which the self-selection constraint binds, i.e. we would
want to subsidize high-income individual's savings. Conversely, if the
elderly on average consume more skilled-labor-intensive goods and
services, like complex medical procedures, then we want them to do the
opposite, i.e. consume more earlier in life (the ﬁrst period). Thus, the
demand for skilled labor in the next period doesn't unduly increase
compared to unskilled labor (which would then drive down the relative
wages of the unskilled workers). In other words, we would want to tax
high-income individuals' savings. (As we explain in the next section, we
do not believe that this model captures accurately the most important
aspects of capital taxation.)
Thus, in the utilitarian dynamic optimization problem, even with
separability, the consumer rate of discount may not converges to δ
(neigher for high- nor low-ability individuals), and the producer rate of
return is greater or less than δ as increasing K decreases or increases v,
the relative wage. If an increase in capital accumulation increases the
wage diﬀerential (if capital is a complement to highly skilled labor and
a substitut-skilled workers) the optimal level of Fk (assuming separ-
ability in consumption) is higher than the pure discount rate, i.e. the
optimal level of capital accumulation is lower.
5.3. Distortions in the overlapping generations model with unskilled labor
replacing robots
We have already seen that the level of investment in diﬀerent kinds
of investment goods, whether in the private or public sector, depends in
part on the impact of that good (at the margin) on the distribution of
income. Recently, there has been some controversy over the taxation of
robots.50 Assume we have robots that are perfect substitutes for un-
skilled labor.
Consider robots (a particular type of machine), each costing one
unit of ordinary capital goods, replacing unskilled labor. Our produc-
tion function is now Q= F(L1+ R,L2,K− R). Production eﬃciency







∂ ⎞⎠ = −λ L L
v
R
γ F FV ( )t L K2
2
1 1 (20)
where = −∂∂ − −vR F FF F FFln1 11 131 21 232 . Eq. (20) implies that when there is
production eﬃciency (FL1= FK) there should be further investments in
unskilled labor replacing robots if it increases ν; and if it decreases ν,
the level of investment in robots should be decreased (there should be a
tax on that kind of robot). Thus, so long as the direct eﬀect of “com-
petition” from robots driving down wages (F11 < 0) dominates any
secondary eﬀects from the decrease in K on wages of highly skilled
workers, it is desirable to tax unskilled labor replacing robots. It is easy
to see that that is the case for the standard Cobb-Douglas production
function Q= L1α1L2α2K1−α1−α2.51,52
5.4. Central message
The central message of this section of the paper is simple: tax and
expenditure policies can have eﬀects on the distribution of income that
cannot be fully oﬀset by other tax and subsidy policies. Measures that
improve the market distribution of income (here increase ν) are desir-
able. Heuristically, we can think of such measures as reducing the
burden imposed on distortionary consumption taxation. This result
provides theoretical underpinnings for recent policy perspectives, noted
in the introduction, which have emphasized the importance of
achieving greater equality of market incomes. Thus, tax and ex-
penditure policies need to be sensitive to the general equilibrium dis-
tributional consequences. A tax that has the eﬀect of reducing the de-
mand for unskilled labor should be reduced from the level which it
otherwise would have been; conversely if it increases the demand for
unskilled labor, it should be increased. Public investments should be
targeted to increase the productivity of unskilled workers. Private ex-
penditures aimed at replacing unskilled labor with machines should be
discouraged (through taxation).
The mechanism by which the welfare beneﬁts are generated in this
model is not just the direct eﬀect on, say, unskilled workers. In the
context of a government already engaged in welfare-maximizing re-
distributions with lump-sum taxes, all that would matter is what hap-
pens to aggregate output. But such taxes and redistributions are not
feasible. Hence, changes in relative wages also matter because they may
aﬀect the constraints on redistribution. Here, the central constraint is
the self-selection constraint. In our model, an “improvement” in the
distribution of income through an increase in the relative wage of un-
skilled workers loosens the self-selection constraint and thus enables
the government to engage in further redistributions that improve so-
cietal welfare. Our analysis formalizes the notion that improving the
before-tax distribution of income makes it easier to get a better after-tax
distribution of income.
More generally, there are a broad set of hard-to-model political
constraints. It is apparent that tax policy does not quickly (if at all) act
to oﬀset changes in the market distribution of income. Thus, an im-
provement in the before-tax distribution of income will typically lead to
an improvement in the after-tax distribution of income and in societal
welfare.
Perhaps the most striking result is that these concerns over dis-
tribution are so strong that they justify policies that lead to production
ineﬃciency. In Diamond-Mirrlees, any distributive beneﬁts achieved
through production ineﬃciency could be achieved at lower cost simply
by adjusting tax rates. But if there are restraints on the set of feasible
taxes that go beyond just limitations on lump sum taxes, then govern-
ment cannot necessarily achieve the general equilibrium eﬀects on
distribution that are obtained through distortionary production taxes
(including tariﬀs).
6. Layered self-selection
There is one more important set of circumstances requiring sig-
niﬁcant modiﬁcation of the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) framework.
The standard Mirrlees model, of which our analysis can be viewed as an
elaboration, is based on self-employed individuals producing widgets.
The government can only observe the number of widgets produced, not
the hours worked, and therefore it cannot infer abilities. But in fact, in
49 In contrast to the earlier result where FK= 1/δ.
50 Bill Gates suggested that there should be such a tax (Delaney, 2017). There was the
predictable backlash among those who thought that that was foolish, since it would in-
terfere with eﬃciency and impede innovation. This paper explains why the former charge
has no validity. The second might. If there is learning by doing with spillovers to other
sectors, there is a presumption that the government should be subsidizing robot devel-
opment. (See Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2014), and a tax or subsidy discussed here should be
viewed as an increase or decrease in that tax.
51 Where {(F11− F13) / F1}− {(F21− F23) / F2}=−Q / (L1+R*) < 0.
52 A similar analysis applies to skilled-labor-replacing robots.
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modern economies, most individuals work for others, and their em-
ployers also need to identify abilities. Individuals too will seek to de-
monstrate to their employers that they are more able, so as to obtain
higher wages.53 While screening and signaling may be done in a
number of ways, the government may be able to partially free ride on
this information; and in any case, government has to take into account
that tax policies aﬀect screening and signaling.
Consider the simplest case where an employer cannot observe either
an individual's output, Y, or his ability, but can observe his level of
education. But Y itself is a function of education, E, and ability, A. High-
and low-ability individuals diﬀer in the cost of education, so we can
write utility as Vi= Vi(w,E), with i=1, 2, where w is the wage paid to
the individual with education E, with a low-ability individual's in-
diﬀerence curve in {E,w} space being steeper: he requires a greater
increase in wages to compensate him for getting more education. The
standard competitive equilibrium entails a separating equilibrium, with
{E1∗,w1∗} being the point on the low-ability production function (or
more precisely, w1= f1(E1)) that maximizes V1. {E2∗,w2∗} is the point
along the high ability's productivity curve w2= f2(E2)) satisfying the
self-selection constraint: V1{E1∗,w1∗}≥V1{E2∗,w2∗}. If w is observable
to the government, even if E is not, the government knows the ability of
the individual. The government eﬀectively free rides oﬀ of the private
sector. By eﬀectively imposing a lump-sum tax on high-wage in-
dividuals, in turn used to pay a lump-sum subsidy to low-wage in-
dividuals, the government can achieve another Pareto-eﬃcient self-se-
lection equilibrium that is more in accord with its social welfare
function.54 In this case, optimal income taxation is far simpler than that
modelled by Mirrlees.
But there is a more diﬃcult case, where there are binding self-se-
lection constraints where the outcomes of the private self-selection
processes are not observable. Consider, in particular, the above edu-
cation model, but where education aﬀects individuals' productivity.
Firms observe this, and pay a wage accordingly; but, as in Mirrlees, the
government cannot observe the wage (output per hour) or education
level. In the absence of taxation, individuals' utility can be written as a
function of their wage (=productivity) and E: Vi= Vi(w,E), where now
individuals can choose how much to work. We now need to embed the
private self-selection constraint inside our social welfare maximization
problem, adding a term to our Lagrangian ζ
[V1(C1,L1,E1) – V1(C2,L2,E2)], where we have reverted to our usual
notation where 1 is the low-ability individual and 2 is the high-ability.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that education level E requires a vector of
consumption Ci(E) and time Li(E) which yield no direct utility, leaving
C−Ci(E) and L− Li(E) for “real” consumption and leisure. While E is
observable, and the functions Ci(E) and Li(E) are known, the type of the
individual is not, so that if one type mimics another, the government
can only infer the eﬀects, e.g. on the marginal rates of substitutions. The
resource constraint also needs to be rewritten to include the costs and
beneﬁts of education55: C1+ C2+ E1+ E2= F(L1f(E1)+ L2f(E2)). Note
that while the binding self-selection in the usual optimal tax problem
entails the high-ability individual pretending to be low abil-
ity—working less and getting a lower income—in the usual competitive
market equilibrium, the binding self-selection constraint entails the
low-ability individual pretending to be high ability. Thus, as he in-
creases his education level (to imitate the high-ability individual) and
so gets a high wage (w2), he also may be required to work more. It is
this which upsets the standard results of optimal tax theory.
Focusing in particular on the ﬁrst order conditions for L2 and C2j,
there is an additional term −ζVL1 and −ζVC2j
1.56 If ζ=0, (i.e. the
private self-selection constraint was not binding), we would have much
as before (letting λ1= 0)








































be no marginal tax on the high-ability individual. But with ζ > 0, we
have
















so that in general, the MRS is not equal to the MRT: there should be
intervention even in the labor market of high ability individuals. By the
same token the marginal rate of substitution between two commodities










1 which equals unity only if ζVC2j
1= ζVC2k
1,
which is true if ζ=0 or if VC2j
1= VC2k
1. As earlier, we can write:
− = −γ ( ).MRS MRS MRT MRS2 1 1
Thus, if the low-ability individual is mimicking the high-ability in the
acquisition of education, he is spending more on, say, tutoring services and
more time doing homework, leaving less income and less leisure. If,
somehow, the result is that the marginal rate of substitution between good j
and k is the same, that would mean that MRT=MRS1=MRS2=1, i.e.
there should be no consumption taxes; and in the case of consumption at
diﬀerent dates, no interest income tax. But education takes away from “net”
consumption and leisure when the individual is young, and thus inevitably
changes the MRS between consumption at t and t+1: it will diﬀer between
high-ability and low-ability individuals. Taxing interest income—making
the future less valuable at the margin relative to today—discourages low-
ability individuals from imitating high-ability, loosening the private self-
selection constraint, and thus increasing welfare.
The general point is that tax structures aﬀect private mechanisms
for sorting individuals, and government needs to take into account
these impacts. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott et al. (1994)
established that, in general, whenever there are self-selection con-
straints, the competitive equilibrium is not (constrained) Pareto eﬃ-
cient. The distortions are ﬁrst order. Small taxes have a second-order
deadweight loss associated with them, but can have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect
in correcting distortions associated with self-selection constraints, e.g.
in improving the eﬃciency of market sorting. Thus, we can think of
optimal taxation as entailing two parts: (a) corrective taxation, to
53 See Stiglitz (1975), where it is established that under certain conditions, there may
exist a pooling equilibrium. The only competitive self-selection equilibria entail separa-
tion.
54 The taxes will, of course, aﬀect equilibrium wages and education levels, because of
income eﬀects.
55 In this formulation, E and C occur simultaneously. A more natural formulation
(especially in our dynamic model) is that there are three periods in an individual's life, in
the ﬁrst of which he gets educated, in the second of which he works, and in the third of
which he is retired. None of the results are dependent on this formulation.
Moreover, this formulation assumes that skilled and unskilled labor are perfect sub-
stitutes. The more general case is considered in Section 5.
56 In general, there are several self-selection constraints, all of which could be binding:
(a) the low-ability individual is indiﬀerent between mimicking the high-ability in the eyes
of the ﬁrm; (b) the high-ability individual who has obtained a high level of education is
indiﬀerent between mimicking the low-ability individual who has obtained a low level of
education in the eyes of the government; and (c) the low-ability individual who has
mimicked a high-ability individual in obtaining a high level of education (and thus has
become more productive) is indiﬀerent between mimicking a low-ability individual who
has not obtained a high level of education. But in this model, if a high-ability individual is
indiﬀerent between mimicking a low-ability individual in the eyes of the government,
then a low-ability individual would not want to simultaneously pretend before his em-
ployer to be high ability (and thus get a high level of education) and pretend before the
government to be low ability, for in doing so, he reduces the value of education, since in
imitating the low ability, he must restrict the number of hours worked. Thus, here we can
focus simply on the single additional self-selection constraint. Whether we have to include
a still further self-selection constraint, the more general point remains valid that the
addition of the new self-selection constraint means that only when certain separability
conditions are satisﬁed will it be desirable not to impose distortionary taxation on the
high ability individual.
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ensure that the market is Pareto eﬃcient; (b) redistributive taxation, to
move us towards a “better” Pareto eﬃcient allocation. Not surprisingly,
when both of these are taken into account, the presumption of AS 76
that there should not be intertemporal taxation no longer holds.
7. Inheritances
The most critical assumption underlying Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) was that all individuals were identical except for their abilities.
But there are huge diﬀerences in inherited wealth and huge diﬀerences
in returns to capital of those with wealth.57 Much of the argument for
capital taxation is that taxation of capital and returns to capital can
achieve greater equity at a lower cost (say in terms of the deadweight
losses associated with the tax) than just reliance on an earned income
tax. In Section 3, we commented on the taxation of capital in the
context of a world in which individuals diﬀer in their ability to generate
returns on capital. Here, we focus on inheritances.
It is easy (in principle) to separate the taxation of inheritances and
the return on inheritances from the life-cycle savings discussed in
previous sections. The latter can be thought of as put into Income
Retirement Accounts (IRA’s), and the analysis of earlier sections argued
that in the absence of e.g. distributive eﬀects and with separability,
there should be no taxation of returns in IRA’s. But that says nothing
about the taxation of capital in general, which we will argue should be
taxed, and possibly at a high rate. If some inherited savings slips into
IRA’s and not all life cycle savings is included in tax-exempt IRA’s, there
would be some presumption for taxing the return to capital in IRA’s, but
still taxing the return to capital not in IRA’s.
An analysis of optimal/Paretoves-eﬃcient taxation of inheritances
entails two complications, beyond the general equilibrium distributive
eﬀects upon which Section 5 focused. (a) A full analysis of taxation and
inequality in the presence of bequests has to come to terms with the
drivers of ﬁnancial and human capital bequests—the determinants of
the intergenerational transmission of advantage and disadvantage.58
(b) It is not obvious what the appropriate social welfare function should
be.
7.1. Determinants of inheritances and the intergenerational transmission of
advantages
Individual’s' life time income (wealth) is determined by their en-
dowments–inherited ability, education provided by their parents and
the state, and inherited ﬁnancial wealth—and the returns on those
endowments, themselves a function of those endowments, eﬀort and
luck. Thus, there are three sources of high levels of lifetime wealth:
children who have the good fortune of having parents who bequeath
them good endowments, either high abilities or substantial amounts of
ﬁnancial and human capital; high levels of eﬀort; and those who get
high earnings on their endowments, often as a result of luck. The latter
include the inventors and entrepreneurs who earn outsized incomes,
often through the exploitation of market power. Gates and Rockefeller
are examples. The “successful” also include individuals who are parti-
cularly eﬀective in receiving favors from the state, e.g. in the form of
land grants. In many cases, wealth begets wealth through a variety of
mechanisms, including the exercise of market and political power and
returns to information asymmetries.
While some of the determinants are under the control of the in-
dividual, others are not: most importantly, inherited ability. (Some
important aspects of the transmission process, besides taxation, are
matters of public policy—most importantly, education.) This implies
that any model of equilibrium wealth distribution must entail at least
two (linked) stochastic diﬀerence or diﬀerential equations—one for
ability and one for (ﬁnancial and human) capital (Stiglitz, 1966, 2015;
Bevan, 1974, 1979; Bevan and Stiglitz, 1979). While some receive a
high inheritance because of the luck of having parents with a high
“taste” for bequests, others because of the luck of having very rich
parents, others because they have fewer siblings among whom the
wealth of the parents have to be divided, there is still a fourth source of
diﬀerences in inherited wealth (more important among “life-cycle sa-
vers”): in the absence of good annuities and reverse mortgages, upper
individuals who do not wish to turn to the government for support in
their ﬁnal years have to hold more than what they actuarially need to
live; on average, they die before eating up all of their savings. The
children of those who die early may receive a small fortune, especially
if there are no siblings.59 While it is natural that economists begin with
a discussion of choices and tastes (some individuals or dynasties might
give greater weight to their descendants than others),60 almost surely,
these other factors are as or more important.
In most of these cases there is little reason to believe that, in gen-
eral, taxing transfers at the top at a high marginal rate would have
signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects on economic activity. For instance, the
amount of money that individuals hold for their old age as a result of
the absence of annuity markets is likely determined largely by the in-
dividual's risk aversion, the extent of public support for the aged and
expectations of support from one's children, and uncertainties about life
expectancy. Fertility decisions are similarly unlikely to be signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by inheritance taxation. The eﬀorts of those like Gates and
Rockefeller (either at innovative and entrepreneurial activities or at
exerting market power) are unlikely to be aﬀected much by high in-
heritance or capital taxation at levels of wealth and income exceeding
some billions of dollars. Indeed, there is some positive evidence and
theory that high marginal tax rates might reduce incentives for rent
seeking and exploitation, thereby increasing economic eﬃciency.61
Thus, there is some presumption that there should be high tax rates
on very large bequests, the main concern being not that individuals
won't work as hard, but that they would engage more in tax avoidance
activities (in the extreme cases, changing residence to avoid taxation).62
Concern about inherited wealth inequality would center progressive
taxation on inheritances, not bequests.
Whatever the reason, in practice, in most countries there is still
substantial intergenerational transfer of wealth, implying that even
with bequest taxes, there will be individuals with substantial incomes
from inherited capital. Thus, (progressive) taxation on capital arises
naturally within any utilitarian framework. It can be viewed as an in-
direct (and imperfect) way of taxing bequests, as a second-best response
to an important source of inequality.63
7.2. Objectives
While Pareto eﬃciency and utilitarianism provide a natural fra-
mework for evaluating alternative taxes on wages, the welfare eva-
luation of inheritance taxes is more complicated. As Stiglitz (1987)
noted, bequests are doubly blessed: while they give utility to the giver,
they also give utility to the receiver. There is a positive consumption
externality. There is thus a presumption that there will be an
57 In a world without uncertainty in returns, the taxation of capital and the return to
capital are equivalent, but this is not so in general.
58 See Stiglitz (1966, 1969a, and, most related to the discussion here, 2015 and 2017)
and Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) for a more extensive discussion.
59 This theory supports a Pareto tail distribution. See Stiglitz (1978). Flemming (1979)
and Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) show the empirical importance of such bequests.
60 See, for instance Piketty and Saez (2013).
61 See Piketty et al. (2014) and Stiglitz (2017).
62 To the extent that individuals are engaged in intertemporal income smoothing with
their children, inheritances lead to less variability in consumption. But taxing in-
heritances and using the proceeds for investments in human capital and redistributive
transfers can more than oﬀset both these and other adverse general equilibrium eﬀects.
See Stiglitz (1978), Bevan and Stiglitz (1979) and the discussion below.
63 See Cremer and Pestieau (2006) and Cremer et al. (2003), Farhi and Werning
(2010), Piketty and Saez (2013), and Stiglitz (2017).
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undersupply of bequests, all else being equal, and that they should be
subsidized.64 In the context of models such as those considered in
previous sections, apart from this externality eﬀect—and possible
general equilibrium distributive eﬀects of the kind discussed in the
previous section – bequests are just another form of utility-generating
expenditure, and thus there should be no bequest taxation if (and only
if) if there is separability between consumption (now including be-
quests) and labor (Kaplow, 2001).65
7.2.1. Trade-oﬀs between consumption inequality and wealth inequality
But there are two reasons for thinking that this analysis does not fully
capture societal concerns about inequality. First, note that there may be a
trade-oﬀ: the imposition of inheritance taxes, in the absence of oﬀsetting
taxes, may increase consumption inequalities, in a world in which bequests
serve to smooth consumption within a dynasty, i.e. where rich parents share
some of their wealth with their children (Stiglitz, 1976b). Consider a model
(such as Bevan and Stiglitz, 1979) where individuals themselves think about
their children and, when they have good luck, either being born with high
ability or getting an unusually large return on their investments, set aside an
optimal amount to share with their descendants. Ignoring general equili-
brium eﬀects (impacts on the distribution of income and self-selection
constraints), each individual is optimally smoothing income over genera-
tions. It might seem that so long as the family's intertemporal discount rate
is the same as the social welfare function,66 there is no reason for govern-
ment to engage in intertemporal distribution. But that is not correct: it is still
the case that at this moment some families have a possibly substantially
larger endowment of “ability” and capital than others, and therefore a re-
distributive tax would be desirable.67 Moreover, at each period in the future,
some individuals get a better roll of the dice—given their parents, they have
higher wages or higher returns on their inherited capital. While they opti-
mally share their good fortune with their descendants, they don't share their
good fortune at all with others who have had a bad roll of the dice, ending
up with low wages or low returns on capital. A utilitarian would wish to
redistribute income between the lucky individual and those who had a bad
roll of the dice. (Indeed, so would an individual, behind a veil of ignorance,
not knowing how the dice would roll.)
If the government can observe inherited wealth It, then, at time 0,
there should obviously be a tax on the inheritance and on returns to
inherited capital. Indeed, taxing past bequests (capital that individuals
have already inherited) at 100% is non-distortionary and would thus be
part of a utilitarian optimal tax program. Of course, this is just the
standard paradox of capital taxation: in the absence of some form of
commitment, savers would know this, and there would be no savings
and investment. There has to be some way that governments can make
a credible commitment not to impose such taxes. We do not answer that
question here, but rather ask, if the government could make a credible
commitment to, say, a ﬁxed inheritance tax and/or return to capital,
how would those taxes be determined?68 With such a commitment, the
government must balance the beneﬁts of greater equality across fa-
milies with reduced intertemporal smoothing of consumption within
the dynastic (and more broadly, other aspects of deadweight loss as-
sociated with distortionary taxation). In principle, the optimal tax
function would relate the tax paid by the individual at time t to all
observables related to his current behavior and past history (i.e. to Yt, It
for all t≤ to, where to is today's date), since such data (together with
knowledge of the stochastic processes) convey information about re-
levant current-period variables, in particular wt (the individual's
ability). For instance, if ability were perfectly inherited, information
from previous periods' incomes of the parents perfectly conveys in-
formation about the individual's current ability. If there is a high cor-
relation, past data would still convey considerable information. (Since
the standard models assume Markovian processes for ability, only the
previous period income is relevant.69)
Of course, individuals know this, and if they care about their des-
cendants, as assumed here, their behavior would correspondingly ad-
just. This can have profound consequences, including that the equili-
brium is not a separating equilibrium (as in the previous sections of this
paper) but a pooling one.70 We thus have to compare the level of social
welfare with the optimal tax of the form T(Yt,Yt−1, It, It−1) with that
generated simply by a tax of the form: T(Yt, It). In the latter case, taxes
would have to take into account the self-selection constraints described
in previous sections of the paper.71
7.2.2. Societal implications of inequalities of wealth and inheritance
Should society be concerned with consumption inequalities within a
generation, with inequalities in dynastic utility, or with inequalities in
wealth? Societies with large wealth inequalities are diﬀerent; large
wealth inequalities are associated with inequalities in political power
and access to privilege. If society is concerned with excessive inequal-
ities in wealth, then progressive inheritance taxes may be desirable,
even if they cause deadweight losses in utility, in inducing excessive
consumption of an individual within his lifetime. Concerns about ex-
tremes of inequalities in lifetime consumption can then be addressed
separately by a progressive lifetime consumption tax.
Bequests as a source of inequality may be viewed as particularly
iniquitous, because such bequests mean that there is not a level playing
ﬁeld; there is no equality of opportunity.72 While society cannot create
a perfectly level playing ﬁeld, there are some forms of inequal-
ity—those associated with the transmission of ﬁnancial wealth—which
can be redressed. The question again is the costs of doing so. Since the
64 This idea has been incorporated into and commented upon by many of the more
recent models of inheritance taxation. See, e.g. Kaplow (2001) and Piketty and Saez
(2013). At the same time there is another important externality, that associated with an
increase in inequality. There is a large literature emphasizing how inequality aﬀects
economic performance and society more generally. Most of the economics literature on
bequests has not incorporated these important externalities.
65 Much of the literature models the utility of bequests in a reduced form, rather than
as a result of increasing the utility of one's descendants, the beneﬁts of which are in-
corporated into one's well-being. Standard structural modelling (e.g. a dynastic utility
function) also naturally entails separability between labor and bequests.
66 And putting aside the fact noted above that in a utilitarian framework, a bequest
gives utility to both the giver and the receiver.
67 One obviously cannot study this eﬀect in a model in which, starting at time 0, all
individuals begin with the same wealth and ability, and making random draws going
forward. In that world, at time 0, there would be no need for taxation; but subsequent
periods would begin with wealth and ability inequalities, and redistributive taxation
would be desirable. Of course, at time 0, individuals would know this, and that would
aﬀect behavior at time 0.
68 No democratic government can make such commitments, and it is apparent that
(footnote continued)
diﬀerent parties have diﬀerent views about the appropriate tax rate. Much political
campaigning centers around such issues. Each party should however take into account the
likelihood that a successor government would change tax rates, and the eﬀect of per-
ceptions that this might be so on behavior. One can reconcile observed behavior, e.g. of
the Republican Party in the US, as they adopt regressive taxation—which are more likely
to be reversed with the next Democratic period of control– with this perspective by as-
suming that they have become increasingly short-sighted, perhaps because of a belief in
declining probabilities of success in future elections; see Korinek and Stiglitz (2008,
2009).
69 There is some evidence that the ability generating process is not so simple, e.g. that
characteristics of the grandparents may aﬀect the grandchildren independently of the
state of the child.
70 See Roberts (1982) and Stiglitz (2009b)
71 In our earlier analysis, we implicitly assumed that the government did not make use
of the information implicit in the inheritability of ability. But while using such in-
formation would almost surely be viewed as politically unacceptable, inheritances are
correlated with the income of previous generations.
72 It is worth noting that equality of opportunity is a distinctively diﬀerent norm that
that associated with, say, maximizing an inequality averse dynastic social welfare func-
tion (Kanbur and Siglitz, 2015, 2016). Equality of opportunity says the probability that an
individual will be in any given decile during his life is independent of the decile of his
parents. A two period egalitarian family social welfare function W=W(Ut,Ut+1) would
seek to compensate an individual whose father is poor (and therefore whose childhood
has more likely been spent in poverty) with higher income, calling for a quite diﬀerent
transition matrix.
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marginal costs of small distortions are small, and, given the large in-
equities which currently exist, the marginal beneﬁt of the corre-
sponding reduction in inequalities arising from inheritance taxes and
taxes on non-life-cycle capital income are large, there is a presumption
in favor of such taxes.
8. Optimal taxation in a two-class model
A simpliﬁcation in which these perspectives can be investigated
more closely and which captures well key elements of a modern capi-
talist economy entails workers in an overlapping generations model and
a second group with so much inherited wealth that their wealth dwarfs
their wage income, and so we ignore it. The latter group we refer to as
capitalists; the former as workers. We focus on the diﬀerences in well-
being between these two groups, rather than diﬀerences within each
group.73
Total capital in the economy is workers' capital and capitalists'
capital, generating a two-class model along the lines studied earlier
by Pasinetti (1962), Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) and Stiglitz
(1967, 2015). We extend the model here by introducing utility-
maximizing workers and capitalists.74 Capitalists maximize a stan-
dard intertemporal utility function with discount factor 1/δ. We
normalize by assuming workers have a (ﬁxed) population of unity,
capitalists of N, so capitalists' consumption is N Cc. We simplify the
analysis by assuming the government simply wishes to maximize
workers' steady-state consumption.75 We assume, for simplicity, that
the labor supply is ﬁxed (at unity as well).76 Here, we assume all
revenues from taxation are spent on education. Later subsections will
generalize the results. Then output, Q, is a constant-returns-to-scale
function of (private) capital, K, and eﬀective labor, which is a
function of investment in human capital per capita, which, noting
that labor supply has been normalized at unity, can be written as ϕ
(Kg), with ϕ′(Kg)≥ 0 and ϕ"(Kg)≤ 0. So Q= F(K,ϕ(Kg)). Investments
in education increase productivity, but there are diminishing returns.
Because of constant returns to scale in capital and eﬀective labor, we
can write:
= =Q ϕ f K ϕ ϕ f k( / ) ( ) (21)
where =k Kϕ the capital-“eﬀective labor” ratio. We assume a tax rate
of τ on the net return to capital.77 This implies that in long-run
equilibrium k is given by:
+ = − ′ − =τ f η δ1 r (1 )( ) (22)
where r is the (after-tax net) rate of return on capital, η is the rate of
depreciation and the tax is applied only to net returns. The after-tax
net return to capital is simply related to the pure rate of time dis-
count. Eq. (23) determines the equilibrium value of k as a function of
τ (given η and δ).78
= ′ = − ″ <k ψ τ ψ τ( ), with ( ) δ/(1 τ)2f 0. (23)
We denote by ko the value of k when τ=0: ko≡ ψ(0). Tax revenue
is τ (f′− η)K, all of which is spent on public education. Hence







Assuming workers have homothetic indiﬀerence curves between
consumption when young and old,79 worker savings are given by sw(r)
w,where w is the wage:
= = − ′w ϕ K g k ϕ K f kf( ) ( ) ( ) ( )g g (25)
where g(k)= f− kf′ is the return per unit of eﬀective labor. Hence
= =K s r ϕ K g k s δ ϕ K g ψ τ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))w w g gw (26)
using Eq. (23). Eq. (24) can be used to solve Kg as a function of τ. There
is a unique solution if τ is small or if < =ζζ 1, where d ϕd Klnln g , the elas-
ticity of productivity with respect to investments in human capital. We
can also solve for workers' stead-state utility, Vw= Vw(w, r), which de-
pends just on {w, r}= {w, δ}, which from Eqs. (24) and (25) depends
just on τ.
Taking the logarithmic derivative of w (from Eq. (25)), we can es-
tablish the tax rate that maximizes workers' welfare (and, given social
weights that put little weight on capitalists' well-being, approximately
maximizes societal welfare). Increasing τ increases Kg but decreases k
and hence g, the wage per eﬃciency unit. The optimal tax balances the
two eﬀects:







where = +a cd b c( ) , = −c ζ ζ1 ; b= SK/σ; and = −d ,σS δ r(1 ) ( / )K where
σ=elasticity of substitution and SK= f′k/f. The larger is the elasticity
of the return to human capital ζ, the larger τ∗; and the larger the elas-
ticity of substitution, the smaller is the adverse eﬀect on wages of an
increase, and thus the larger is τ∗. Hence, we have Proposition 8a
below.
Proposition 8a. Provided 0 < ζ < 1, there is a strictly positive tax
rate on capital taxation to ﬁnance education.80
These results assume that there is no productive public investment
to augment the productivity of capital goods and no transfers. More
generally, the total income of a worker with transfers but net of labor
taxes t is given by
= − ′ + − − −W ϕ f kf τ rK K K( ) tg PI
where KPI is investment in public capital goods allocated to augmenting
capital productivity, and K represents as before just private capital.
Output is a CRTS function of eﬀective labor, KPI and K: Q= F(K,KPI,ϕ
(Kg)L).
If the tax were only used to ﬁnance lump-sum transfers to
workers, then workers' (after transfer) wage is given by
W= g(k)+ τ(f′− η)k. At τ=0, = − + ′ − =kδ f η k( ) 0dWdτ . But
straightforward diﬀerentiation shows that for τ > 0, < 0dWdτ , implying
Proposition 8b below.
Proposition 8b. A tax on capital used to ﬁnance a lump sum-transfer to
workers is welfare-decreasing.
If all tax revenues go to public capital that augments the productivity
73 With stochastic wages and returns to capital, these can be analyzed along the lines of
Stiglitz (2015). As discussed in the previous section, Pareto eﬃcient taxation within each
group can be analyzed in standard models such as those presented in earlier sections of
this paper.
74 Thus, we generalize Mattauch et al. (2016) and Mattauch et al. (2017). Their models
used logarithmic utility functions for both capitalists and workers, which naturally gen-
erate the kinds of ﬁxed savings rates assumed by the earlier literature. Mattauch et al.,
2017 focused on ascertaining the conditions under which in equilibrium all capital was
held by workers. Here, we assume that the tax rates on capital (or on capitalists) are low
enough that this is not so.
75 Similar results obtain if we analyze more generally Pareto-eﬃcient tax structures, or
tax structures which maximize a more general inequality averse social welfare function,
so long as the disparity between the two groups is large enough, so that the marginal
social utility of consumption of capitalists relative to that of workers is small enough.
76 Thus, while earlier sections focused on the issue of the labor supply elasticity, here
our concern is on savings. Results on the desirability of capital taxation would be
strengthened by allowing a positive labor supply elasticity.
77 Again, similar results obtain if one can diﬀerentiate between taxes on capital for
workers and that of capitalists, or if capitalists engage in some tax avoidance activities, to
convert some of their capital income into what appears as wage income.
78 Throughout the analysis below, we assume we are in an equilibrium in which there
are capitalists. See Pasinetti (1962), Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) and Stiglitz (1967,
2015, 2016) and Mattauch et al., 2017.
79 If they don't, then Kw= S (w, r), and the analysis proceeds much as below.
80 A tax levied only on the capital earnings of capitalists would be even more favorable
to workers.
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of private capital, then = ( )( )Q F H K L, ,KKPI 81 and in equilibrium the
eﬀective capital/labor ratio is determined so that:
′ − − =Hf k η τ δ( ( ) )(1 ) . (28)
Since public investment is ﬁnanced by a tax on capital: KPI= τKHf′,
implying that ≡z KKPI is given by
= ′z τH z f k( ) ( ) (29)
Substituting into Eq. (28), we obtain: − =− τ δ(1 )zτ η , implying that
= + −( )z τ η δ τ1 . This can be solved for z as a function of τ, substituted
into Eq. (29), so that we can solve for k as a function of τ. Workers'
wages increase as k increases, i.e. as − + >+( )m(1 ) 1 1δη δ ,
where= ′H z
H
. Thus, if public capital investments are not too “capital-
augmenting,” then workers' incomes are increased by an increase in
capital taxation with revenues used for capital-augmenting public ca-
pital (even with capital goods capturing the direct returns).
On the other hand, if the funds are spent on capital goods that
substitute for private capital goods, then the aggregate capital labor
ratio need not even fall; even with limited productive human capital
investments, workers' income (through an increase in wages and/or
transfers) may increase, and so will their welfare.82 With the return to
capitalists' capital below the critical threshold, they eventually consume
their wealth. The economy is then supported by public investment. This
result holds even if public investment is not as productive as private
investment, so long as it is not too much less productive.
The central point is simple: while a capital tax (the proceeds of
which are simply distributed to workers) hurts workers because of
adverse incidence eﬀects, under quite general conditions,83 with an
equalitarian social welfare function it is desirable to impose a tax on
capitalists' return to capital, and with large disparities in income be-
tween capitalists and workers, strong equalitarianism, and high pro-
ductivity of investments in human capital, the optimal tax on capital
may be very high. If tax revenues are invested in capital goods that
either increase the productivity of private capital goods (but not too
much) or substitute for private capital goods, then again taxation on
capital is desirable. Indeed, in the latter case, a tax on capital over the
long run may result in capitalists consuming all of their capital.
9. Concluding remarks
It is remarkable that so much of the policy literature has focused on
simplistic models in which diﬀerences among individuals were limited,
arising mostly out of diﬀerences in wage incomes. The Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1976 model was useful in reminding us that the role of com-
modity taxation had to be seen in conjunction with other taxes that
were in place as well as taxes that we might have wanted to have in
place, but which are not there—a general principle of considerable
importance. When there was an optimal non-linear income tax, the role
of commodity taxation was limited. Its role could be seen in two ways.
First, as improving the before-tax (market) distribution of income,
putting less of a burden on distortionary redistributive taxes.
Alternatively, it could be seen as part of the general theory of corrective
taxation. Whenever there are self-selection constraints in an economy,
there will be a ﬁrst-order distortion, and commodity taxation can be
used to reduce the magnitude of that distortion. This is true whether the
self-selection constraint arises purely within the private public sec-
tor–from the government attempting to engage in redistributive tax-
ation–or also within the private sector–from the more able individuals
attempting to appropriate their ability rents. The presence of self-se-
lection constraints represents a big wedge, a big distortion, in the
economy. It is worth creating a small distortion elsewhere in the
economy if it can reduce the size of this wedge.84
Public investment too needs to take into account its eﬀects on the
market distribution of income, and how it alters the distribution of
income and self-selection constraints within the economy. In general,
even asymptotically and even with separability, the rate of discount for
public investment varies across public projects, and may be greater or
less than the social rate of discount.
There are many other limitations to the basic Atkinson-Stiglitz
model that we have not explored here. We have, in particular, assumed
the absence of tax evasion and avoidance, and in particular the ability
to shift income from one category to another. In practice, it is often
diﬃcult to distinguish between capital and labor income, especially for
self-employed individuals; and if that is the case, large diﬀerences in tax
rates provide large incentives to convert wage income into capital in-
come.85
This is perhaps related to one of the deepest criticisms of the lit-
erature on optimal non-linear taxes: in practice, there are many re-
straints. We have noted, for instance, if government is restrained to
using a linear income tax, commodity taxation is still desirable. The
rationale is somewhat diﬀerent from that presented above. Such taxa-
tion may improve the before-tax distribution of income, as we have
emphasized, but even if it does not do this, it may enable us, with little
social deadweight loss, to improve the after-tax and transfer distribu-
tion of income, and thus social welfare. A tax on perfume may generate
signiﬁcant revenues from a subset of high-income in-
dividuals—individuals who, even with an optimal linear income tax,
have a much lower social marginal utility than poor individuals. So too
for a bread subsidy. Though as Deaton noted, with linear expenditure
systems, one can't achieve improvements through perfume taxes and
bread subsidies, there may be signiﬁcant departures from those patterns
of expenditure.
This leads to the question: why the restraints? There are obvious
advantages to simplicity, but when one looks at the tax code, it is clear
that simplicity itself is not the guiding principle. Making the tax system
non-linear, with several brackets, adds virtually no cost in a modern
computer-driven tax system, raising a key point: what is costly or fea-
sible depends on technology, and that changes over time—with some
changes endogenously driven. When Vickrey advocated the use of
congestion taxes, a good congestion tax could not have been im-
plemented. But advances in technology now make the administrative
costs associated with imposing taxes low. Economists often refer to
81 This formulation is chosen so that the production function is constant returns to
scale. It is assumed that the government does not appropriate directly the returns to
public capital goods, but rather, the returns are appropriately by the owners of capital
goods (just as the returns to human capital are appropriated by workers).
82 That is, if Q= F(K+KPI, L), then the expenditures on public capital goods drive
down the after-tax rate of interest so that (f′− η)(1− τ) < δ, in which case capitalists
start to “eat” their capital. To ensure that capital taxation does not decrease wages, it
must be the case that π > sp, where π=relative productivity of public investment and
1− sp is the fraction of proﬁts consumed (“wasted” on capitalists).
83 The result can be shown to hold with more general utility functions for capitalists
(e.g. recursive Koopmans functions, so that the long-run interest rate need not be in-
variant to tax policy.) It also holds with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of taxation, e.g. a wealth
tax on capitalists, or a tax on intergenerational transfers, rather than a tax on their net
income.
84 Thus, it is desirable to introduce random taxation, even though all individuals are
risk-averse, if by doing so the self-selection constraints are relaxed. See Stiglitz (1982b)
and Brito et al. (1995).
85 There are, of course, other widely noted limitations on the model, which limit the
direct applicability of the result: (a) Hours may be partially observable, in which case
government would want to use that information; and (b) there may be large stochastic
elements in the translation of labor, given an individual's ability and eﬀort, into income.
In dynamic models, as we noted earlier, observations of an individual in time t are re-
levant to inferences at subsequent dates (and this may even be true of observations of an
individual's parents). Optimal taxation ought to make use of that information, but if in-
dividuals know this, it aﬀects behavior. In eﬀect, the models here entail a commitment on
the part of government not to use such information. The models here are adverse-selec-
tion models. There are also important incentive eﬀects, e.g. in eﬀort and education. Thus,
a full analysis would include both eﬀects, with incentive compatibility constraints added
to the self-selection constraints. (For a discussion of optimal taxation with moral hazard,
see Arnott and Stiglitz, 1986.)
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political costs, but my experience with “political constraints” is that
they are soft and ambiguous. What seems like an insurmountable bar-
rier at one time can be suddenly overcome, especially as economists
explain the high costs of such a constraint. I had argued some quarter
century ago that there would be substantial beneﬁts from substantially
increasing the standard deduction, moving many individuals out of the
income tax net and reducing the importance of many key distortionary
deductions and credits, but it was claimed that doing so was politically
infeasible. Then, suddenly, in 2017, in the US, it happened. I would
have thought that in a democracy, a tax cut for billionaires ﬁnanced by
tax increases for lower income individuals would be infeasible; again, in
2017, it happened.
There are two sets of constraints for which there are important ra-
tionales. One is that large diﬀerential tax rates, say between capital and
labor, open up large opportunities for arbitrage. So too for large dif-
ferential rates among classes of similar activities. More broadly, there
are limitations in what government can observe, and what it can pre-
cisely deﬁne, and those limitations provide openings for arbitrage and
distortions. When there are large diﬀerences in marginal tax rates,
money can be shifted from one person (say in a family) to another.
Much of the complexity of the tax system arises from these forms of
diﬀerentiation, and any tax structure needs to take this into account.86
Most importantly, there is a simple reason to tax the returns to ca-
pital of the very rich: it is equitable. With any equality-preferring social
welfare function with suﬃcient weight on equity, the beneﬁts in terms
of social equity would outweigh the distortionary eﬀects, given the
disparities in incomes observed in advanced countries such as the
United States. The intertemporal distortions in consumption patterns
aﬀect the very rich, when the tax is levied only on very high incomes.
But even if a capital tax is also levied on workers it may be desirable. If
the proceeds of the tax are invested in ways that suﬃciently enhance
the productivity of workers and/or provide suﬃciently highly valued
public goods, workers are better oﬀ, and the gains to the workers more
than oﬀset the losses to the “capitalists” who bear the tax. We have
shown that, in general, the adverse incidence eﬀect on workers as a
result of capitalists' reduced savings can be oﬀset. With the standard
utilitarian social welfare functions, with the degree of concavity con-
ventionally assumed, there can be even considerable ineﬃciency in
public investments, and still capital taxes would be desirable.
All of this has been predicated on individualistic inequality-averse
social welfare functions. But there is increasing awareness that in-
equality itself may have an adverse eﬀect on societal well-being, and
even productivity.87 There is an increasing awareness that living in an
unequal society changes the nature of society and the nature of those
that live within it, with eﬀects on preferences and behavior of both
those at the top and the bottom that would widely be agreed to be
adverse.88 Indeed, there is increasing evidence that inequality itself
may aﬀect productivity.89 Once we take these consequences of in-
equality into account, the case for a progressive tax on the income from
capital, and in particular, taxing at a high rate the return to what we
have identiﬁed as “capitalists' capital” becomes even more compelling.
I believe that Tony would have agreed with these conclusions.
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